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I .  INTRODUCTION 
This Article is about boilerplate language located at the back of 
contracts drafted by the world's largest law firms. The clauses in 
question are process provisions that regulate the amendment of 
sovereign debt contracts . These paragraphs have been drafted and 
redrafted by generations of corporate lawyers , yet they have changed 
little in their broad outlines in more than a century of use. Now they 
take center stage in the global financial arena, where they govern 
billions of dollars (and pounds, euros, and yen) of sovereign debt in 
default and billions more in imminent risk of default . Officials ,  
academics ,  and even some of the lawyers who drafted the clauses now 
want the clauses removed because they make defaulted debt difficult 
to restructure . 
How did this arcane preserve of the bond lawyer come to be the 
cutting edge in the evolution of international financial architecture? 
Whereas private debt defaults lead to bankruptcy, sovereign debt 
defaults lead to informal, often lengthy standstills .  The creditors can 
wait out the period of distress ,  expecting eventual economic recovery 
to lead to a resumption of payments. But, for the most part, payment 
resumption requires that creditors come to the negotiating table to 
rewrite the defaulted debt contracts . Such a "composition" or 
"restructuring" scales down the sovereign's obligations and causes it to 
return to health quickly .  In theory, this makes both the sovereign and 
its creditors better off. 
There are practical barriers to be overcome before a 
composition can be concluded. These stem from information 
asymmetries, from coordination problems, or from complex bargaining 
dynamics .  Sovereign compositions tend to be tripartite negotiations .  
In addition to the sovereign and the existing creditors, international 
financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
come to the table holding out new loans. In theory, these loans are 
conditional, requiring the sovereign to reform its economic policies and 
the unpaid creditors to share the pain by cutting back their claims to 
induce lending that facilitates economic recovery . In practice, the IMF 
often acts precipitously, bailing out the sovereign so as to stabilize the 
international financial system or satisfy some other political goal of its 
major shareholders . The prospect of a bailout diminishes the creditors' 
incentive to come to the bargaining table to make concessions. 
Assuming bargaining commences, the bond contracts contain 
boilerplate clauses, called "unanimous action clauses" (or "UACs"), 
that erect a barrier to success . These clauses, which condition 
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amendment of the bond contracts' key payment terms on unanimous 
bondholder consent, govern the majority of sovereign bonds 
outstanding. A minority of bond contracts contain "collective action 
clauses" (or "CACs") , which permit across-the -board amendments with 
a three-quarters majority . Whereas CACs facilitate restructuring of 
the defaulting sovereign's debt, UACs stand in the way. With 
thousands of bondholders dispersed around the globe, coordinating a 
unanimous vote is difficult , if not impossible. Further, a unanimous 
vote requirement invites free riding: Because the transaction makes 
the group as a whole better off, an opportunistic bondholder has an 
incentive to "hold out"-to withhold its essential vote in hopes of 
procuring a side payment from the transaction's proponents .  
The cumulation of frictions has led to calls for the institution of 
a sovereign bankruptcy regime. This would resemble corporate 
bankruptcy reorganization, albeit tailored for sovereign debt. The IMF 
has proposed a minimal bankruptcy architecture, one that would 
trump UACs and facilitate restructuring in a majority action 
framework. The United States Treasury agreed on the need for 
majority action, but has registered a contractarian objection to the 
IMF's plan for a new statutory scheme:  Since UACs lie at the core of 
the problem and UACs are contract terms, the solution lies in 
persuading the market to rewrite sovereign bond contracts rather 
than in overriding them with an international mandate. Now that the 
official sector refuses to bail out every sovereign in distress, Argentina 
being the most prominent example, UACs constitute less of a strategic 
advantage . On the assumption that CACs are otherwise superior to 
UACs in terms of efficiency, the Treasury projects that sovereign 
bondholders will willingly exchange their UAC bonds for CAC bonds, 
ameliorating the coordination problems. Sovereign debt restructuring 
can then go forward in a framework of free contract . 
Sovereign bondholders and sovereign borrowers at first 
rejected both proposals-the IMF's bankruptcy plan and the 
Treasury's spontaneous bond exchange suggestion. These real parties 
in interest preferred the status quo . But their motives were suspect. 
To the extent that the status quo m akes unconditional IMF bailouts 
more likely, the sovereigns and their lenders have reason to oppose 
reform, whether mandatory or contractual . 1 Official sector pressure 
l. For a recent overview of the "financial architecture debate," see Barry Eichengreen, 
Restructuring Soveriegn Debt: Analyt l:cal Issues and Polic), Proposals, J. ECON .  PERSP. 
(forthcoming Fall 2004); Peter B. Kenen, The International Financial Arch itecture: Old Issues 
and New Initiatives, 5 10JT'L FIN. 23, �6 (2002); Marcus Miller, Postscript  Sovereign Debt  
Restructuring: New Articles, New Controcts-Or No Change?, i n  SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS, 
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has since broken the pattern of universal market OpposItIOn. A 
handful of sovereign issuers have successfully departed from market 
practice and include CACs in new bonds . The present question is 
whether this development heralds a market-wide shift to CACs as 
advocated by the Treasury. 
This Article inquires into the causes of this multiparty dispute . 
It takes a new look at the economics of sovereign lending, identifying 
interests fundamental to the sovereign debtor-creditor relationship 
that have been obscured in a debate focused largely on opportunism 
occasioned by IMF bailout lending. This different focus leads us to 
identify unsound premises on both sides of the dispute between 
contract and mandate . 
The contractarians propound a "free lunch" theory of sovereign 
lending. They assume that CACs are a first best improvement over 
UACs, and that a transition to CACs holds out a surplus for all parties 
to share.  Unfortunately, no such twenty-dollar bill has been left lying 
on the table . In our view, sovereign lenders rationally could prefer 
UACs to CACs, and could do so even in a world without IMF bailout 
lending. It follows, on a worst-case scenario , that engrained resistance 
will prevent a voluntary, market-wide transition to CAC bonds, and 
that a majority action regime may be achieved only on a mandatory 
basis. On a best-case scenario, it follows that frictions will impede a 
market transition from UACs to CACs. If the international financial 
community wishes the incipient transition to become general and 
remain stable, it will have to pay for it. Yet it is unclear where the 
money would come from to pay UAC bondholders to trade their bonds 
for CAC bonds. In the alternative, the IMF will have to intervene 
aggressively, forcing model contract terms on sovereign borrowers by 
threatening penalties for those who borrow with UACs .  The best-case 
scenario, thus characterized, is essentially mandatory intervention. 
We accordingly agree with sovereign bankruptcy proponents 
who doubt that the markets will spontaneously and quickly shift from 
UACs to CACs once participants realize that bailouts are no longer 
readily available . But we also suggest that the bondholder community 
and the sovereign debtors have legitimate reasons for remaining 
suspicious of bankruptcy proposals .  The IMF's proposal rests on a 
triad of majority action, cost savings, and administrative convenience 
as it simultaneously attempts to address the need for a better 
framework for bailout lending and to rationalize the process of 
CRISES AND RESTRUCTURING 183, 185 (Vinod K. Aggarwal & Brigitte Granville eels . .  2003) 
(describing the evolution of the conflict between the IMF and United States Treasury positions 
since April 1, 2002). 
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sovereign debt composition. These elements do not import a 
persuasive normative grounding for a bankruptcy regime. The 
economics of sovereign lending suggest a stronger, contract-based 
norm-the best interest of creditors ,2 defined as whatever the unpaid 
lenders freely approve. Under the norm, only the creditors themselves 
should determine whether a given composition serves their best 
interests .  It follows that a sovereign bankruptcy process should not 
attempt to replicate the transactional bias of American corporate 
reorganization, where the need to close the deal can override other 
concerns. In the sovereign context, the long-run interests of defaulting 
sovereigns and their creditors are more closely aligned than those of 
defaulting private borrowers and creditors . If sovereign creditors do 
not like the restructuring on offer, it must be allowed to fail. 
Under this view, a sovereign bankruptcy regime need do little 
more than trump UACs with CACs and then leave the parties to 
renegotiate their contracts. With CACs in place (however imposed) ,  
the parties can be  remitted to the law governing their contracts-the 
law of the State of New York in most cases-without nee ding the 
assistance of a bankruptcy infrastructure. 
But one problem remains with this minimal approach, a 
problem stemming from the contractual jurisprudence of sovereign 
debt. 3 Once a renegotiation framework is established, a given 
creditor's worst enemy may be neither the defaulting sovereign nor 
the IMF, but another creditor or group of creditors with conflicting 
interests . The contract law of New York is undeveloped on the 
question of whether sovereign creditors owe one another Ineaningful 
good faith duties .  The law of private debtor-creditor relations, 
meanwhile, rejects the suggestion that creditors should owe duties to 
one another, leaving the job of constraining opportunistic behavior 
within the creditor group to the bankruptcy system.4 Over a century 
ago, however, in the period antedating the federal statutory 
reorganization regime , intercreditor duties did exist. As we see it, the 
2. As distinguished fro m  the "best interests of creditors" as used in the j urisprudence of 
corporate bankruptcy in the United States. See infra text accompanying note 123 .  Coming at the 
problem from a different angle, economist Andrei Shleifer has also recently argued for a norm of 
"the best interest of creditors . "  See ANDREI SHLEIFER, WILL THE SOVEREIGN D EBT MARKET 
SURVIVE? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.  9493, 2003) . 
3. The closest the economics literature gets to recognizing this point is Barry 
Eichengreen's observation that debtor-creditor negotiations have been quick to produce results 
when the parties have shown good faith. Barry Eichengreen, Crisis Resolution: Why We Need a 
Krueger-Lihe Process to Obtain a Taylor-Like Res ult 5 (Apr.  29 ,  2002), 
http ://emlab .berkeley.edu/users/eichengr/policyliiekrueger.pd£. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 207 -227 .  
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matter of intercreditor equity became cabined in the federal 
bankruptcy reorganization regime after that regime appeared in 1 934. 
Thereafter, state case law on intercreditor equity atrophied, replaced  
by  a regime of contractual self-protection. A viable framework for 
sovereign restructuring, whether contract based or encapsulated in a 
bankruptcy regime, needs an adj udicatory authority willing to impose 
good faith duties  across groups of creditors .  
The Article proceeds as follows .  Part I I  draws o n  the economics 
and practice of sovereign lending to assert that sovereign bankruptcy 
proposals should not be driven exclusively by the bailout problem. 
Reform proposals need to address the fundamentals of sovereign 
debtor-creditor relationships that operate independently of IMF 
intervention. These fundamentals help to articulate a contract-based 
norm, the best interest of creditors . 
Part III looks at the sovereign bankruptcy movement to show 
that the best interest norm already has influenced its participants ,  
albeit implicitly . The most prominent proposal, that of the IMF, has 
evolved  towards both minimalism and creditor involvement. Some of 
what the IMF proposes to provide, however, is either unnecessary or 
inimical to the creditors '  best interests. Most importantly, it is unclear 
that the IMF's involvement in the administration of such a system 
adds anything of value to either the sovereigns or their creditors . 
Part IV appraises the CAC versus UAC debate . Here we 
encounter a puzzle: the persistent use for more than a century of 
UACs in New York-based sovereign debt issues and CACs in London­
based debt issues. A fre quent explanation of this puzzle centers on the 
Trust Indenture Act of 1939,5  which embeds the UAC in publicly 
issued corporate bond contracts in the United States,6 therefore 
implying that a path dependency constrains the drafting of New York 
sovereign contracts. We reject this contract failure explanation and 
propose instead a multiple equilibrium explanation. Under this 
explanation, UACs and CACs are both rational solutions to an 
intractable problem. The choice between the two entails trade offs , 
and is a matter of lender preference under uncertainty rather than a 
function of an efficiency calculation. One factor leading lenders to 
favor UACs is the lack of a good faith backstop, which results in a 
need for self-protection. Holding out is the only weapon one has in a 
5 .  1 5  U.S.C. § 77aaa (2000). 
6 .  For discussion, see Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibi tion in Bond Worhouts, 97 YALE L.J. 
232, 250·51  (1987). 
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world in which creditors motivated by side deals can Impose 
suboptimal compositions by majority rule.  
Part V projects that such side deals and giveaways will occur if 
sovereign debt compositions are negotiated under CACs.  Resolution of 
these disputes,  therefore , requires a robust good faith principle.  We 
draw on the history of corporate reorganization prior to the enactment 
of section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1 9347 to show that courts have 
grappled with these questions before , intervening on e quitable 
principles .  
II .  RELATIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 
Discussions of sovereign debt reform have focused primarily on 
what mechanisms can be borrowed from the corporate bankruptcy 
context. Little attention has been paid to the differences between the 
economics of the two contexts and these differences' implications for a 
sovereign bankruptcy regime. This part performs that task.s 
A. Background 
Today's sovereign default crisis follows from the growth of the 
market for emerging country debt in the 1 990s. Between 1 992 and 
1 997,  credit flowed copiously into emerging markets, averaging $ 1 54 
billion a year .9  But risk perceptions in the emerging country debt 
market changed after a succession of financial crises-in Mexico in 
1995 and then in East Asia and Russia in 1 997 and 1 998.10 Demand 
for emerging market securities dropped to $50 billion per year in the 
period from 1 998 to 2000. 1 l A full-blown crisis ensued in 200 1 ,  when 
7. Act of June 7, 1 934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 91 1 ,  912 (repealed 1938) .  
8 .  INT'L MONETARY FUND, T H E  D ESIGN O F  THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
MECHANISM-FuRTHER CONSIDERATIONS (2002) (performing an analogous function in the 
context of IMF policy and planning), http ://www. imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrml2002/ 1 12702.pdf. 
9. In hindsight, much of this investment looks to have been overoptimistic, based on 
inadequate information about emerging nations' economic, political, and institutional problems. 
See Guillermo A. Calvo, Globalization Hazard and Delayed Reform in E merging Markets, 
LACEA Presidential Address (Oct. 18, 200 1 ) ,  http ://www.depeco.econo .unlp . 
edu. ar/jemi/2002/trabaj02.pdf. Lenders may have underestimated the likelihood of liquidity 
crises and other economic distress .  Alternatively, they may have assumed that troubled 
sovereigns would be bailed out by the IMF. See general ly Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, 
and Authority in International Financial Reform, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 6 1 3  (2001)  (arguing that 
international organization into nation-states causes continuing global vulnerability to financial 
crises), auailable at http://www.oup.co.uk/jielaw/hdbNolume_ 41 Issue_04/pdf/0406 13 .pdf. 
10 .  JOSEPH E .  STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 89-98,  1 1 9-27,  1 42 -5 1  (2002) . 
1 1 .  John B .  Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S .  Perspective, Remarks at Institute 
for International Economics (Apr. 2, 2002) , http://www.ustreas.gov/press/ releases/p02056.htm. 
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Argentina, its economy in collapse, defaulted without the benefit of an 
emergency credit facility from the IMF. 12 The flow of debt to emerging 
market governments in 2002 slowed to under $ 1 2 billion-a trickle 
compared to the flows of 1 992-97 . 13 This sovereign debt crisis follows 
other emerging market (and particularly Latin American) defaults of 
the 1 930s and 1 980s.  
Argentina's default changed the rules of the game in sovereign 
lending. In the mid 1 990s,  emergency credit provided by the IMF (and 
the United States Treasury) cured the liquidity crises of countries like 
Mexico and the East Asian tigers . Arguably, a two-sided moral hazard 
problem resulted.  One defective incentive lay with the sovereigns.  
Rehabilitation was achieved on an accelerated timetable thanks to the 
IMF's financial backing. We suspect that the IMF made these 
investments less for the purpose of rehabilitation than for the 
purposes of preventing contagion from spreading through the 
international financial system and protecting its political interests . 
The moral hazard problem of insured credit resulted .  If the IMF was 
going to come in with cash, prudent borrowing made no sense . The 
second defective incentive lay with the private lenders . Some of the 
IMF's emergency funding, provided to forestall further crises, went 
directly into the pockets of banks and bondholders . Until the IMF 
found a way out of this bailout trap , sovereign lending threatened to 
become a high interest-low risk free  lunch. 14 
These incentive problems have been ameliorated in recent 
times .  Defaults by Russia and Argentina terminated the expectation 
that all large economies would be bailed out. At the same time, the 
IMF has conditioned loans to Ukraine and Ecuador, both suffering 
liquidity crises ,  on bondholder concessions . 15 "Constructive ambiguity" 
now describes the posture of the official sector, and private lenders 
now proceed at their own risk. But amelioration does not mean 
solution. 16 The bailouts of Brazil , Uruguay, and Paraguay in 2002 17 
For more detailed data on capital flows to emerging market eco nomies, see INST. OF INT'L FIN., 
INC., CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES (2002). 
12. Arturo C. Porrzecanski, Dealing with Sovereign Debt: Trends and Implications, in  
SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS 27-33 (Chris Jachnick & Fraser Preston eds., forthcoming 
2004). 
13. See A Better Way to Go Bust, ECON01VIIST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 64, 64 (reporting the latest 
sta tistics out of the Institute of International Finance). 
14. Ta rullo , supra note 9, at 649-51. discusses these problems in detail. 
15. Id. at 650. 
1 6. For discussion, see [d. at 6 31-32, 649-51. 
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mean that incentive problems persist. The IMF still has reason to seek 
a means by which to force bondholders to participate in emergency 
rehabilitations , scaling down their claims as a condition to the 
provision of emergency loans.  A sovereign bankruptcy regime looms 
large as the means to this end. 
What is good for the IMF also may be good economic policy: 
Bondholder free rides on IMF bail outs are distortionary; lenders to 
distressed sovereigns should do no better than they would have done 
in the absence of an emergency credit facility. But it does not follow 
that what is good for the IMF necessarily makes for good economic 
policy: A bankruptcy procedure suited to the IMF's institutional 
preferences could also be  distortionary and costly if it made lenders to 
a distressed sovereign worse off than they would have been in its 
absence (and in the absence of IMF bailout lending) . 
Just as bankruptcy's superiority over contractual composition 
cannot be assumed, nor can the IMF's cost-benefit perspective be 
accorded automatic hegemony . 18 The IMF's perspective dominates the 
discussion over bondholder objections .because the bondholders are 
dismissed as opportunists,  who are simply attempting to sustain the 
flow of rents from bailouts . This dismissal is precipitous. 
Consideration also must be given to a new regime's impact on the 
fundamentals of the sovereign debtor-creditor relationship, viewed 
independently of the moral hazard problem stemming from the IMF's 
interventions. 
This Part assays the incentive structure of sovereign lending. If 
law reform is to create value, it cannot model sovereign lenders only 
as economic opportunists.  They also must be viewed as lenders who 
can take capital elsewhere if reform fails to address their concerns .  We 
describe this zone of concern as "the best interest of creditors ."  
B. Corporate and Sovereign Borrowing Compared 
Borrowers and lenders are natural enemies, more likely to 
conform to economic predictions of self-interest than human b eings in 
most other relationships .  Before the loan is made, the vulnerabilities 
lie on the borrower's side . The borrower needs the credit that the 
lender remains free to refuse. Once the loan closes, however, the 
vulnerabilities shift. The borrower walks away with the lender's 
17. For a discussion of these crises and the private and official sector responses, see William 
R. Cline, "Private Sector Involvement": Definition, Measurement, and Implementation (Aug. 
2002) , http ://www .bankofengland.co . uk/conferences/conf0207 I cline . pdf. 
1 8. See STIGLITZ, supra note 10,  at 195-2 13 .  
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funds . Nine-tenths of the borrower's contractual expectations are 
fulfilled. Meanwhile, the lender begins a contractual journey fraught 
with exposure to economic risk and human opportunism. For 
protection, the private lender relies on the legal regime that enforces 
the promise to pay. 
Sovereign debt is different. It presents a puzzle, for the 
sovereign lender has no recourse to a reliable enforcement authority. 19 
For the most part, sovereign obligations cannot be directly enforced in 
the sovereign obligor's own courts . 20 A century ago, gunboat diplomacy 
by creditor governments sometimes took the lawsuit's place .2 1  But the 
gunboats have been mothballed. Now the sovereign creditor's only 
direct recourse lies in the courts of countries like the United States 
and the United Kingdom, which by statute have relaxed the 
traditional sovereign immunity barrier .22 But an unpaid lender takes 
up this enforcement opportunity only in the exceptional case. Going to 
court in a G-7 (or similar) country is beneficial only if the lender 
identifies property of the defaulting sovereign in that jurisdiction (or 
in another jurisdiction willing to levy execution on the first 
jurisdiction's judgment) . And defaulting sovereigns try their best not 
to leave valuables lying around. 
Even if an avenue of direct enforcement opens up, the 
sovereign creditor is at a disadvantage relative to its corporate 
counterpart. Unlike a defaulting corporate borrower, a sovereign 
cannot be liquidated. Nor can a composition that scales down a 
sovereign's obligations to a manageable level be effected at the 
expense of an equity interest, as occurs in corporate reorganizations. 
19 .  See, e .g . ,  Charles Lipson, The IJl;IF, Commercial Banhs, and Third World Debts, in  DEBT 
AND THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 317 , 322-23 (Joshua D. Aranson ed., 19 79) (describing the 
central puzzle in sovereign debt as that of why "so many states, with such diverse political 
structures, continue to service debts in spite of the political and social costs") . 
20.  See Hal S. Scott, A Banhruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors, 37 INT'L LAW. 103, 1 1 6-
17 (2003) . 
2 1 .  See, e .g . ,  Paul de Grauve & Michael Fratianni, The Political Economy of International 
Lending, 4 CATO J. 147 , 158  (1 984) . The assertion that gunboat diplomacy played a role in 
inducing countries to pay their debts has been challenged forcefully in a recent book by political 
scientist Mike Tomz, who says that the primary reason that countries repay debts is in order to 
maintain or improve their reputations. See Michael R. Tomz, Sovereign Debt and International 
Cooperation: Reputational Reasons for Lending and Repayment 1 2-48 (Oct.  2001) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors). The fear of sanctions, according to Tomz, has never been a 
primary motivating factor for sovereign debt repayment. Id. at 49-79. 
22 .  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U .S .C .  §§  1330, 1332(a)(4) , 1 39 1 (f), 1441 (d), 1 602-
1 6 1 1  (2000) ; State Immunities Act, 1978, 26 & 27 Eliz. 2 ,  c .  33,  reprinted in 17 I .L.M. 1123 
(1978). 
12 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol .  57 : 1 
The sovereign's citizens are its equity interest and its debt deals do 
not contemplate their being "wiped out" for the benefit of creditors .  23 
The lender's powerlessness leaves the sovereign borrower with 
a disincentive to pay, and the borrower will default whenever the 
expected value of future financing falls below its present debt 
servicing costS . 24 Even though the sovereign debt contract is drafted to 
address and facilitate the possibility of conventional enforcement, the 
contract does not come close to guaranteeing that a sovereign able to 
pay will perform its promise. Unlike corporate borrowers, sovereigns 
do not necessarily default because they cannot pay. Whereas corporate 
defaults follow from the exhaustion of resources,  sovereign defaults 
can be acts of political will . Sovereign distress can ripen into default 
when actors in the national government decide that the tax burden 
and administrative costs of debt service are intolerable and that the 
burden of payment (political as well as economic) outweighs the costs 
of default .25 For example, only one of the nations in default in the 
Latin American debt crisis of the 1 980s owed as much as 1 percent of 
gross national product . 26 
Why, then, do lenders extend credit to sovereigns? The answer 
is that sovereigns try hard to pay. As a practical matter, their defaults 
tend to presuppose economic reverses, whether due to 
mismanagement or bad luck. Sovereigns rarely repudiate their debt 
contracts in whole . Defaults are partial, leading to the rescheduling of 
obligations and, in some cases, their reduction.27 Historically, defaults 
by sovereigns have been common even as sovereign loans overall have 
been profitable . 28 Consider Eichengreen and Portes' figures  on 
sovereign issues of the 1 920s .  Coupons were 7 to 8 percent. Defaults 
lowered actual rates of return to 5 percent for London issues and 4 .6  
percent for New York issues. United States Treasury bonds yielded 4 . 1 
23. See Jeremy Bulow, Debt and Defmott: Corporate vs. Sovereign, in NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE 579 (Murray Milgate & John Eatwell eels., 1992) (setting forth 
the most striking differences between corporate and sovereign bankruptcy as being in terms of 
"collateral, control, and continuity'') . 
24. John NLt�Jllard Keynes, Foreign Investment and National Advantage, NATION & 
ATHENEUM, Aug. 9, 1924, at 584, 585. 
25. Jonathan Eaton, Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Contracts, 4 J. 
ECON. P ERSP . 43 , 48·49 (1990). 
26. That country was Chile . See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting 
Model of Sovereign Debt, 97 J. POL. ECON. 155, 156 (1989). 
27. See Lee C. Buchheit, Of Creditors, Preferred and Otherwise, INT'L FIN. L .  REV., June 
1991, at 12 (discussing sorting of creditors in the course of restructuring). 
28. Kenneth Tvi. Kletzer & Brian D .  Wright, Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter, 90 AM. 
ECON . REV. 621, 621 n.1 (2000) (citing study by Lindert and Morton of 1552 sovereign issues of 
ten governments from 1850 to 1983). 
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percent during the period .  Although defaults were frequent, outright 
repudiations were rare , and payments in abeyance recommenced as 
distress passed.29 
The historical pattern implies that default causes negative 
consequences to sovereigns . Defaulting sovereigns eventually must 
return to the credit markets . 30 The need for continued access to credit 
imports an incentive to pay. At the same time, the enforcement threat, 
built into the debt contracts but rarely used in practice, imposes a 
residuum of costs . 
Economic accounts of sovereign debt relationships formalize 
this description. Armed with their analysis, sovereign debt looks less 
paradoxical . 
C. Theories of Sovereign Debt 
The economics of sovereign debt builds on the following axiom: 
Unless default imposes costs on the debtor, not only will the debtor 
not pay the debt, the lender will not make the loan in the first place . 3 1 
As the cost of default decreases, so does the sovereign's borrowing 
capacity. Contrariwise,  as the cost of default increases, it at some 
point becomes so high as to foreclose strategic default.  32 Strategic 
default is an opportunistic breach stemming from the debtor's desire  
to  siphon off the payment flow on the loan for another purpose. In 
contrast, distress default describes a default following an 
unanticipated shortage of resources due to an external shock or  other 
misfortune. Distress  defaults are more excusable than strategic 
defaults.33 To the extent either is costly, default entails welfare losses 
for the debtor and its economy. Despite this, an increase in default 
costs can be efficient if it encourages lending by discouraging strategic 
defaults. 34 
29. Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, After the Deluge: Default, Negotiation, and 
Readjustment During the Interwar Years, in T HE INTERNATIONAL D EBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 12, 27-29 (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert eds . ,  1989) . 
30. Herschel 1. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign Debt  as a Contingent Claim: 
Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Repu tation, 78 AM. ECON . REV. 1088, 1088 (1988). 
3l. Gabrielle Lipworth & Jens Nystedt, Crisis Resolution and Private Sector Adaptation, 
IMF STAFF PAPERS, SPECIAL ISSUE: IMF ANNUAL RES. CONF., Vol. 47, 2001 at 188, 192, 195. 
32. Id. at 195 . 
33. The notion of excusable versus non-excusable defaults is modeled in Grossman & Van 
Huyck, SLtpra note 30. 
34. Contrariwise, if a decrease in the cost of default is welfare maximizing, default is too 
expensive . Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 31, at 199. 
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Within this framework, economists debate two explanations of 
sovereign debt : a reputation theory and an enforcement theory. There 
is evidence to support both. 
1 .  Reputation Theory 
The dominant view is that the primary cost of default to the 
sovereign is exclusion from future borrowing. Assume that national 
economies are cyclical and that people prefer to consume evenly across 
the cycles .  It makes sense for the state to borrow on the downward 
cycle to fund consumption and repay the loans with returns generated 
on the upward cycle .  The cost of default on the upward cycle is the cost 
of being shut out of the credit markets and associated consumption 
constraints on the next downward cycle.  If default means an emb argo 
on future finance, the sovereign preferring smooth consumption pays 
its loan. The only state that repudiates its debt is the state that never 
plans to borrow again.35 
More generally, whether in strategic or distress default, the 
defaulting sovereign converts a gain to itself. Default triggers a lender 
embargo. The debtor ends the embargo by transferring the converted 
surplus to the lenders . So long as this recompense is made, the 
moratorium can be short . 36 
If we assume that the debtor has a high-powered incentive to 
regain access to the credit market, then the lender's problem lies less 
with the default itself than with the possibility of opportunistic 
behavior on the part of other lenders . A lender with no exposure to the 
defaulted debt could break ranks with the unpaid lenders, ignore the 
moratorium, and make a new loan to the defaulting sovereign. To the 
extent a new source of credit is available, the sovereign's incentive to 
35. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt  with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 48 REV. E CON. STUD. 289,  289-90 ( 1981) .  Moi-e elaborate articulations of this 
reputational model open up the class of defaults to distinguish between strategic and distress 
situations and expand the lenders' behavior pattern to allow for the possibility of forgiveness. A 
strategic defaulter that turns out to need future credit is "myopic." When it sees its mistake, it 
becomes "nonmyopic ." It signals its transformation by repaying the defaulted loans. 
Readmission to the credit markets follows. Harold L. Cole et aI. , Default, Settlement, and 
Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt, 36 INT'L E CON. REV. 
365 (1 995) ; see also Tomz, supra note 2 1 ,  at 18-21  (describing how sovereign lenders who default 
can reenter the lending markets by incurring the high cost signal of repaying their earlier debts 
and showing themselves to no longer be "lemons") . 
36. Kletzer & Wright, supra note 28, at 6 2 1 .  The credit inflows to Latin America in the 
early 1990s in the wake of Brady restructurings provide a good example of this. CHARLES W. 
CALOlVlIRIS, How TO RESOLVE THE ARGENTINE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. 
Pol'y Research, Papers and Studies, 2001) ,  at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID. 14869/ 
pub_detail .asp. 
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reach a composition with its unpaid lenders diminishes. Ironically, the 
reputational mechanism returns to working order only if the original 
lenders p ersuade the sovereign borrower to cheat the interloping 
lender . 37 With the interloper thrown into the composition process with 
the other unpaid lenders, the stick of refusal-to-lend held by the 
lenders once more becomes a cost to the sovereign borrower. 38 
2 .  Enforcement Theory 
The contrasting model is built around indirect sanctions.  The 
theory is that a sovereign might rationally repudiate its debts even 
though it still needs a future source of finance to smooth consumption 
in downward cycles. The model depicts a sovereign at the end of an 
upward cycle .  It possesses a cache of capital with which to pay the 
debt incurred on the previous downward cycle. The model suggests 
that the solvent sovereign has a choice. It can either pay the debt or it 
can default and invest the capital in an insurance contract designed to 
protect it against the next downturn. When this investment 
opportunity is available, the rational sovereign will default because, in 
the long run, saving and investing has a higher return than borrowing 
and repaying. When saving and investment of the purloined capital 
accompany the default , the sovereign grows faster, increasing its 
consumption with every turn of the cycle .39 It follows that sovereign 
debt cannot be sustained on pure reputational enforcement. The 
lender must have some additional means by which to inflict financial 
costs on the defaulter .40 
But is the enforcement model "robust to institutional detail?"�l1 
Its authors admit that sovereigns in default leave no obvious assets in 
plain view abroad for fear of creditor attachment. They argue, 
however, that this exercise of international creditor evasion carries 
37. Kletzer & Wright, supra note 28, at 622.  
38. The importance of creditor coordination in order to discipline mavericks who were 
tempted to lend to the sovereign in default during the mid- 1 9th century is described in two recent 
papers. See Mark L.J .  Wright, Reputations and Sovereign Debt (Sept. 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors); Mark L.J. Wright, Sovereign Rish and Creditor Coordinat ion 
(May 200 1) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
39. William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State 
Debts in the 1840s, 86 AIvr. ECON. REV. 259,  267 (1 996) .  If the debtor has no place in which to 
invest, the reputational concern causes it to honor the debt. Harold L.  Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 
The Role of Institutions in Reputation Models of Sovereign Debt, 33 J .  MONETARY ECON. 45, 47 
( 1 995) . 
40. Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 2 6, at 158 ;  Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign 
Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? 79 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 46-47 ( 1989) . 
41 .  Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 40, at 43 .  
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indirect costs . With the sovereign in default, foreign trade must be 
conducted in roundabout ways. For example, the sovereign loses 
access to short-term trade credits like bankers' acceptances, and when 
the sovereign places an asset abroad, a costly dummy entity must be 
used. Even if the costs of evasion are small in relation to GNP, the 
costs still loom large enough in comparison to the defaulte d  interest to 
make repudiation inconvenient: According to the model's proponents, 
even if the costs of default do not exceed 5 percent of total trade, few 
countries show a net gain on debt repudiation.42 Opponents, however, 
argue recent debt crises have yielded little evidence of lender 
interference with the trade of defaulters .43 Moreover, it is not- clear 
why the lenders would want to interfere with the trade of defaulting 
debtors, especially in distress defaults. Choking the debtor's trade only 
prolongs the distress and further delays the payment stream. 
Historians have found evidence to support both theses .44 
3. Implications for Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
There is enough evidence in favor of each model to suggest that 
both figure into the real world dynamics of sovereign debt.  Indeed, the 
situation is dynamic and recent litigation developments could create 
new opportunities for bondholder enforcement.45 Below, we note some 
differences in the normative implications of the two models .46 
On a reputational model, the law has a limited contribution to 
make in solving sovereign debt crises. The defaulting sovereign has an 
incentive to present a plan of composition and lobby creditors for 
approval . Creditors themselves define the "best interest of creditors" 
as they approve or rej ect the sovereign's offer. The cost of default 
derives from the sovereign's long-term interest in credit market 
42 . Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 26, at 158-59, 167, 1 74-75 . .  
-13. Kletzer & Wright, supra note 28,  at 622 ;  see also Tomz, supra note 2 l .  
44.  Compare English, supra note 39 (arguing that defaults of American states during the 
1840s support the reputational model), with .James Conklin, The Theory of Sovereign Debt and 
Spain Under Philip II. 106 J. POL. ECON. 483 (1 998) (arguing that the history of the 1 6th century 
relationship between the Genoese bankers and the Spanish crown supports the enforcement 
model) . 
45. See in/i-a notes 109, 1 1 l .  
46. Rogoff and Zettel meyer note a difference in the models' bearing on the current crisis in 
KENNETH ROGOFF & ,JEROMIN ZETTELlvIEYER, E ARLY IDEAS ON SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 
REORGf\NIZATION: A SURVF:Y (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/57, 2002) . They assert 
that under a reputational model the introduction of a bankruptcy regime will only have the 
minor effect of causing some loss of reputation to the sovereign choosing to invoke it. Under an 
enforcement model, in conh-ast. it is clear that the structure of the bankruptcy process matters a 
great deal . 
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access ,  not from a legally established enforcement structure.  Legal 
intervention thus must be justified by reference to frictions, such as 
coordination problems, that create barriers to otherwise beneficial 
compositions 
On an enforcement model , in contrast, the cost of default varies 
with the enforcement device's effectiveness .  Costs of default could be 
too high (greater debtor welfare loss than needed for the given 
measure of creditor protection) or too low (default cost insufficient to 
import an incentive to perform) . Coordination problems figure here 
too, but in a more complicated way. There is again a concern about 
transaction costs standing in the way of agreement. But these 
transaction costs can play a beneficial role as well .  Assume that the 
costs of default stemming from a trade disruption or a credit 
moratorium are too low, and that additional costs would have the 
effect of deterring strategic defaults .  On this scenario, a creditor 
coordination problem that delays composition and extends the period 
of economic punishment could be efficiency enhancing. 
We note a point of ambiguity . Some economists assert that 
although strategic defaults are a theoretical possibility, sovereigns as 
a practical matter only default under identifiably bad economic 
conditions.47 If true, it follows that the costs of default, whether due to 
reputation or enforcement,  are sufficient to import incentives to 
perform. Indeed, defaults might cost too much.48 Other economists 
assume that either strategic default or distress default is an active 
possibility.49 If strategic defaults are possible ,  then the costs of 
default arguably are too low . The choice between the two descriptions 
is further complicated by the fact that no bright line test lets us assign 
real world defaults to the strategic and distress categories .50 Recall 
that even in a situation of manifest distress due to an external shock, 
the ratio of debt to GNP can remain low enough to leave the sovereign 
with the ability to pay. What looks like a "distress default" may 
therefore follow from a political choice among costly courses of action. 
So long as the sovereign has a choice as to whether or not to default, 
strategy inheres in the fact pattern . 5 1  
47. Grossman & Van Huyck , s upra note 80, at 1088, 
48. For an expansion on this point of view . see INT'L MONETARY FU�D, supra note 8, 'n 8. 
49. See, e.g., Lipworth & ystedt, supra note 3 1 .  at 193 .  
50. This d ifficulty has concrete policy implications. IlVIF planners, for example. are having 
difficulty outlining terms for the activation of its sovereign bankruptcy procedure. See IXr'L 
MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, �'I 84-92. 
5 l .  The foregoing analysis implies a debt ceiling for each sovereign. Tbe greater the 
borrowed amount the greater the benefit of default and the more likely default is signaled b�' the 
borrower's cost-benefit analysis .  The total debt load should not approach that leve l .  E aten & 
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D. The Composition Bargain 
Whatever a default's etiology, and whether our account focuses 
on reputation, enforcement ,  or both, a question arises : Why do unpaid 
creditors agree to take less than they were promised, instead of 
waiting out the distress and insisting that the renewed debtor make 
them whole? 
For a simple scenario in which the debtor plausibly can 
negotiate for a reduction in the interest rate or the principal amount 
(a "haircut") , assume an enforcement model. Assume also that the 
lenders have a costly punishment available . Deployment of the 
punishment is cost effective for the lenders but the expected yield is 
less than the principal and interest owed. The borrower can come to 
the table with an offer of compensation in exchange for the 
withholding of the sanction. So long as the borrower offers more than 
the creditors' expected return from the sanction, they will settle for 
less than originally promised. 52 Further, the creditors cannot credibly 
commit in advance to refuse to renegotiate.53 
Now switch to a reputational model. The sovereign's overhang 
of unpaid loans could discourage new investment. If the forgiveness of 
some of the debt restores the incentive to invest, it can be in the 
incumbent creditors' interest to make a concession. The new 
investment benefits the sovereign's economy, while also making the 
debt worth more than it would have been worth without the 
concessions and the new investment. 54 This is called "the debt Laffer 
Curve," because forgiving part of the debt increases the prospects for 
repayment of the remaining obligation. 55 
Compositions can occur prior to default as well as in the wake 
of default . When a debtor with a current payment record experiences 
liquidity problems,  a composition can be the means to avert default. 
The objective will be to delay near term maturities ,  stretching out the 
Gersovitz, Sllpra note 35, at 289. The debt ceiling will rise, however, as the creditors' 
enforcement devices make default more costly for the debtor. 
52. Jonathan Eaton, Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Contracts, 4 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 43 ,  50-51  (1990). 
53 .  Conklin, supra note 44, at 493-94. A proposed program of IMF funding conditioned on 
creditor concessions would work similarly. 
54. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Marhets with Imperfect 
Inlormation, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 405-06 (1981) . 
55 .  Kenneth Rogoff, Symposium on New Institutions for Developing Country Debt ,  4 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1990). Some question this explanation: with this free lunch sitting on the 
table, one can ask why debt crises take so long to resolve. Creditor coordination problems may be 
the reason. For an argument against the Laffer Curve in respect to Latin American borrowers in 
the 1980s, see Eaton. supra note 52,  at 46-48 .  
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payment schedule and reducing the near term interest burden. There 
will be a basis for trade with the creditors if, due to the liquidity crisis, 
the debt is trading at a substantial discount on expectations that 
payment in full will not be forthcoming. The composition relieves the 
near-term payment burden and averts the risk of default. This creates 
value because default carries collateral costs for both the creditors and 
debtor .56 Pakistan, Ecuador and Ukraine all successfully negotiated 
exchanges along these lines in the late 1990s.  In the latter two cases,  
the price of their bonds went up 20 to 30 percent . 57 Argentina and 
Turkey followed the same model in 200 1 .58 
Ideally, a distressed sovereign restructures prior to default. 
Avoiding default enhances the sovereign's reputation in the credit 
markets and economizes on enforcement costs. Unfortunately, 
liquidity crises often move more quickly than the adjustment 
processes and default proves unavoidable .  
Multiple factors come to bear o n  the composition bargain, 
whether concluded before or after default. Clearly, adequate 
information respecting the debtor's economy, financial condition, and 
future prospects are necessary for the creditors to effectively appraise  
an offer on the table. The debtor comes to the table with some 
bargaining power. Because money has a time value and the future 
state of the debtor's economy remains uncertain, a deal promising the 
resumption of payments after default can be attractive . Institutional 
concerns also can incline creditors toward acceptance .  On the other 
hand, waiting has an option value. Any offer simply holding out an 
increase in the price of bonds will not necessarily garner support . 
Sweeteners may have to be added; for example , an increased interest 
rate on the restructured debt to compensate for a repayment 
deferral. 59 And even with a sweetener added, creditor coordination 
problems can sour the deal. 
56. Among other things , the debtor that defaults on one issue will suffer an inability to 
borrow, cross defaults on all of its bonds, loss of control of the process of restructuring, capital 
outflows, and a general loss of confidence in its economy. All of this negatively impacts the price 
of the bonds as well .  Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 3 1 ,  at 200. 
57. fd. Such dramatic increases may not occur again. The market, worried about hold outs, 
was skeptical about the possibility that the exchange offers could succeed. Henceforth, prices of 
bonds of sovereigns in impending distress will reflect the possibility of successful composition 
prior t.o the exhaustion of liquidity. fd. at 206. 
5S.  See, e.g. , Barry Eichengreen, Financial Crises and What To Do About Them 55,  63- 64 
(200 1) (unpublishecl manuscript, on file with authors) . 
59. fcl. at 5 7 .  
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E. Coordination Problems and Coercive Behavior 
Creditor coordination problems erect barriers to successful 
compositions .  To describe them, we take up the particulars of today's 
sovereign debt crisis .  
Today's crisis holds out coordination problems more daunting 
than those encountered during the 1 980s .  In the 1 980s crisis, 
unanimous assent to compositions at least was feasible because money 
center banks held the bulk of the debt outstanding. Bank lenders are 
repeat players , constrained to cooperate with one another . 60 But the 
cast of characters changed in the 1990s.  The banks sustained 
significant losses in the Latin American crises of the 1980s, and 
withdrew from a dominant role in sovereign lending. The sovereigns, 
returning to the borrowing practices of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, turned to the bond markets .  The shift meant 
larger numbers of creditors holding smaller claims . In mid- 1 999,  for 
example,  Argentina had $ 1 1 1 . 8  billion of foreign issued bonds 
outstanding and $29 .6  billion of bank 10ans .6 1 The bondholders were 
spread all over the world. Many were institutional investors,  but there 
also were also large numbers of small, individual investors­
purchasers of bonds in retail "cookie j ar" offerings in Germany and 
Japan.62 Such a heterogeneous group of creditors inevitably can be 
expected to hold heterogeneous views about the debtor's ability to 
pay. 63 
Obtaining the consent of a multitude of creditors is partly a 
matter of incurring costs (and retaining an underwriter and a proxy 
solicitor) . But there also is a barrier in the contracts themselves .  Of 
Argentina's $ 1 1 1 .8  billion of foreign bonds, 89 percent were issued 
60.  For a description of the workouts of the 19 80s.  see Jessica W .  Miller , Comment, Solving 
the Latin American Sovereign Debt Crisis. 2 2  U. PA. J.  INT'L ECON. L. 6 7 7 ,  679 -89 (200 1 ) .  
6 l .  Pablo E.  Guidotti, On Debt ]vlanage ment a n d  Co llective Action Clauses, i n  REFORMING 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEI'v1 2 6 5 ,  2 7 1  tb1. 1 (Peter B.  Kenen & 
Alexander K. Swoboda eels ., 1 999), ava ilable at http://www .utdt.eelu/�pguidotti/ 
on.elebt.management.and.collective .action.clauses.pdf. 
62.  T he shift in emerging market sovereign debt towards bonds is detailed in Mark L.  J.  
Wright, Sovereign Risk a nd Creditor Coordination (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with authors) .  See o lso Philip J. Power , Note, Sovereign De b t: The Rise of the Secondary Marhet 
ond Its Implicat ions fo r Future Restructuring.>, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2 7 0 1  (1996) .  
6 3 .  For this reason,  i t  makes no sense for a debtor to take the cash it  has reserved for 
principal payments on defaulted debt ard repurchase the debt on the market at deeply 
discounted prices. Once the market sees the buying activity, the price will rise to the reservation 
of price of the creditor with the highest valuation. Ishac Diwan & Dani Rodrik ,  External De b t, 
Adjustment, and Burden Sharing: A Unified Fm meworl" PRINCETON STU D .  INT'L FIN. N o .  73, at 
35-36 (19 92) .  
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pursuant to debt contracts containing unanimous action clauses.n4 
These UACs are customary in bonds issued in the United States, 
Germany, and Japan.65 The remaining 1 1  percent of Argentina's 
bonds were issued in London, where the drafting practice includes 
collective action clauses .  UACs invite free riding: Because the 
transaction makes the group as a whole better off, an opportunistic 
bondholder has an incentive to "hold out"-to withhold her vote in 
hopes of procuring a side payment.66 
UACs do not present an absolute bar to debt restructuring, 
however. A composition can be effected by indirection. Instead of being 
asked to vote on an amendment to their bond contracts, the 
bondholders are asked to exchange their bonds for substitute bonds 
that contain modified terms more favorable to the debtor. The 
proponent of the substitute bonds neither expects nor requests 
universal participation. Even so, the exchange offer does not close 
unless it  garners supermajority acceptance.  Holdouts remain a 
problem, however, because a free riding strategy remains available to 
the bondholder opportunist even if no side payments are forthcoming. 
To say no to an exchange offer is to hold on to your bond. You thereby 
retain the debtor's original prOlnise to pay and all other contract 
rights ,  even as the exchanging majority makes concessions . If the offer 
succeeds, you benefit from the economic recovery, like the creditors 
who exchanged their bonds, without having made any concessions . 
Institutional bondholders known as "vulture funds" specialize in such 
strategic behavior. They typically purchase their bonds on the 
64. Guidotti, supra note 61, at 271  & tbl. l .  
65 . The majority of sovereign bonds choose New Yark law; these include hoth bonds issued 
in New York and E urobond issues. See, e.g. ,  Peter Petas & Rashique Rahman, So uereign Bon ds-­
Legal Aspects that Affect Default and Recovery, GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS, May 1999 .  at 59 .  
60 (finding that over 70 percent of sovereign Eurobonds are issued under New Yod� law) . 
66. These UACs can also be described as lACs, or Individual Action Clauses. because they 
grant bondholders individual rights. See generally Marcel Kahan, Rethinhl:ng COIporate Bonds: 
The Trade- Off Between Individual and Collectiue Rights. 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040 (2002) . 
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secondary market after the onset of distress at a deep discount,67 
looking for short-term returns of up to 30 percent.68 
If only a few creditors hold out, the exchange offer still 
succeeds. Unfortunately, if enough creditors hold out, the exchange 
offer will fail. More particularly, if the subsidy to the holdouts is 
greater than the increase in value to the exchanging creditors ,  every 
one of them is better off by refusing to exchange. 69 The failure of the 
offer then makes everybody worse off. Generally, in corporate 
exchange offers, it takes supermaj ority participation in the exchange 
offer-something more than 90 percent-to minimize the siphoning of 
value to the holdouts and therefore permit the offer to succeed.70 
The process can be manipulated for the borrower's benefit as 
well. Suppose a debtor owes $ 100 and claims to have the resources to 
support a payment of only $50.  Assume it makes a take-it-or-leave-it 
exchange offer-a substitute debt contract with a face amount 50 
percent lower than the original contract . The creditors believe the 
debtor can pay $70 and refuse to exchange, so the debtor tries again, 
this time making the new debt offer senior to the debt in default. On 
an enforcement model of sovereign debt, the creditors now accept the 
offer, because failing to do so leaves them with a claim for $ 100 
against an asset base that certainly will be less than $50.71  
Alternatively, the sovereign could have the new debt secured by a 
payment stream at its disposal. The addition of seniority or security in 
the new issue imports an element of coercion. 
Note that if the debtor makes a coercive offer considered too 
low by substantial number of creditors, the holdout possibility benefits 
the group as whole.72 On the other hand, covenants in standard 
6 7 .  The term "vulture" refers to the fact that these hedge funds typically purchase the debt 
of companies and countries that are in financial distress and, therefore, have debt that is trading 
at a deep discount. Although even the Institute of International Finance-the global association 
of financial institutions-has publicly called for a targeted legal strategy to counter the 
supposedly disruptive activities of vulture funds in the context of sovereign restructurings, these 
funds are not without their supporters. See Vulture Hunt, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at 20 
(arguing that vulture funds serve to provide much needed liquidity in the markets for distressed 
sovereign debt) , 2002 WL 20298184;  John Dizard, A Banhrupt Solution to Sovereign Debt, FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at 24 (arguing that there is nothing problematic about a vulture fund that 
purchases sovereign debt at a deep discount and then sues to be paid in full), 2002 WL 3303702. 
68. John C.  Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Prob lem of 
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L .  REV. 1207, 1 2 1 4  
(1991 ) .  
69. Roe, supra note 6, at 236 .  
70 .  Coffee & Klein, supra note 68, at 1207- 14 .  
7 l .  Calvo, supra note 9 ,  at 13 .  
72 .  Coffee & Klein, supra note 68 ,  at  1223.  
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sovereign debt contracts ("negative pledge" and "pari passu" clauses) 
can be read to make the foregoing ploys ineffective by giving the non­
exchanging creditors a pro rata right to the payment stream of the 
new bonds. 73 If the creditors can sustain this interpretation, they can 
attach the payments on the new bonds, and the coercive exchange 
does not proceed. 
Finally, sovereign debt contracts hand the borrower a weapon 
to use against holdouts: the "exit consent ." The exchange offer is 
combined with amendment of terms in the bond contract that protect 
the bondholders but are subj ect to majority amendment . Under the 
New York practice,  payment terms are subj ect to UACs while 
ancillary promises and process terms that protect the bondholders are 
subject to CACs. As they exit, the cooperative, exchanging 
bondholders approve an amendment that lifts the contract protections 
of the holdouts .  This leaves the holdouts with their original principal 
and interest terms intact, but subject to manipulative action by the 
debtor. For example, the pari passu and negative pledge clauses 
described above may disappear through the exit consent process. For 
the holdouts, the possibility of ever receiving full payment diminishes 
with the loss of these protective provisions.74 Within the past few 
years, exit consents have been used successfully by both Ecuador and 
Uruguay. 75 
F. The Best Interest of Sovereign Creditors 
Summarizing the foregoing economics and contracting practice, 
we now describe the best interest of creditors . 
73 ,  The use of pari passu and negative pledge provisions in this context-that is, where the 
sovereign attempts to grant a new borrower senior rank or security in the form of an earmarking 
of a specific payment stream for it-is very different than a vulture creditor trying to block 
payments to others of equivalent rank who have proceeded with a restructuring. That latter 
tactic, which appeared for the first time in the Elliott suit against Peru in Brussels in 2000,  
depends on a questionable interpretation of the pari passu clause that most commentators 
consider to be incorrect. See infra note 102 ,  The legal validity of that interpretation is beyond the 
scope of this article, 
74, On the use of exit consents to engineer a sovereign restructuring, see Lee C, Buchheit & 
G, Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 70-82 (2000) , 
See also Michael M, Chamberlin, At the Frontier of Exit Consents, Remarks at the Bear Stearns 
and EMCA Sovereign Creditors Rights Conference (Nov. 8, 2001) ,  http://www.emta. org/ 
ndevelop/exitcons.pdf. 
75. See Felix Salmon, Calm After the Storm, EUROMONEY, May 2003, at 100,  103; Felix 
Salmon & Jorge Gallargo, The Buy Side Starts to Bite Bach, EUROMONEY, Apr. 200 1 ,  at 46, 58-
59; Uruguay: Exchange Could Ease Liquidity Problem, but Fiscal Adjustments Remain Key to 
Restoring Solvency, EMERGING MARKETS RES, NEWSL, (J .P.  Morgan, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 30, 
2003, at 1 .  
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On a reputation model , default amounts to a standstill that 
endures until the sovereign (a) emerges from distress ,  and (b) 
determines that the benefits of renewed access to credit outweigh the 
costs of making payments on the old debt. Agreement on a composition 
can hasten reentry because scaling down the amount of old debt 
increases the sovereign's borrowing capacity. When the sovereign has 
a source of new borrowing to use in restoring its economic health, the 
incumbent creditors have an additional reason to agree to take less .  
But the floor on concessions is determined by the payoffs . If a debtor 
demanded deep concessions but the creditors projected an anemic 
economic recovery, then the creditors would likely reject the debtor's 
demands. 
In contrast, when the market value of the debt after the 
composition is greater than the market value prior, the debtor and 
creditor will bargain over a surplus. The allocation of the surplus 
between the debtor and the creditors depends on a number of 
variables, including information asymmetries and economic volatility. 
But, at the bottom line, the sovereign must c ater to the creditors, since 
it pays them only for the purpose of returning to their good graces .  
Now shift to an enforcement model of sovereign debt .  This 
changes the variables but delivers us to the same negotiating table.  
The borrower comes to the table because the default imposes costs on 
foreign trade; costs that make it harder to get out of distres s .  These 
costs of default do not redound to the creditors' immediate benefit, 
however, even as they have to invest in enforcement initiatives .  Their 
unpaid bonds trade at discounts as a result . The double negative­
costs on both the borrower and lender sides-creates room for trade . 
These descriptions reveal a lot about the best interest of 
creditors without suggesting that a bankruptcy regime would enhance 
creditor welfare . This is because the models are populated by rational 
actors and outcomes follow from the presence or absence of a surplus.  
Given a surplus , the parties figure out a way to divide it ,  but given no 
surplus, there is no deal and the creditors are better off waiting. 
Within this framework, a bankruptcy system can be justified 
three ways. First, it may help bring a surplus into existence. This 
would be the case where unilateral creditor enforcement actions 
prevented sovereign recovery without benefiting the creditors as a 
whole .  This also would be the case if the IMF and other official sector 
actors decided that bankruptcy advanced their own purposes and 
made submission to the constraints of a bankruptcy system a 
condition to financial relief progrmTIs.  Relief in the form of new 
lending can contribute to the creation of a surplus, justifying the 
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bankruptcy regime. Second, a bankruptcy regime may prevent a 
surplus from being dissipated. This would be the case if enforcement 
actions by creditors occurred frequently, causing costs of disruption to 
outweigh the benefits to the creditors as a whole .  Third, a bankruptcy 
regime may overcome process frictions . Coordination problems could 
make it hard for sovereigns to get the composition proposal a full 
hearing. Even if compositions could be concluded without a formal 
bankruptcy regime, a legally constituted and protected space for 
renegotiation could, in theory, facilitate a debtor-creditor accord. By 
helping the creditors cheaply determine their best interest, it could 
make everyone better off. Alternatively, the dispersed creditors could 
have a collective action problem. The sovereign might exploit this by 
making a short duration take-it-or-leave-it exchange offer designed to 
allocate the majority of the surplus to itself. Finally, given debt 
contracts containing UACs (and perhaps even with CAC contracts) , 
creditor opportunism in the form of holding out could prevent an 
otherwise advantageous composition from garnering sufficient assent. 
There is a distinction among the three j ustifications for 
sovereign bankruptcy. The first and second justifications address the 
maximization of a surplus, in both cases triggered by value-depressive 
enforcement opportunities.  Under a reputational model, neither 
justification is available . The third justification, with its focus on 
process and coercion, applies to both models of sovereign debt. To the 
extent that the reputational model has the greater resonance in real 
world practice, as we think has been the case up to now, the third 
justification should shape the bankruptcy regime. On this theory, 
sovereign bankruptcy should focus on solving creditor coordination 
problems and protecting against debtor overreaching in the division of 
the surplus rather than on containing creditor enforcement. 
The best interest of creditors will vary with the circumstances .  
Where the sovereign is  poised to recover, the best interest is  a 
contractual arrangement that both restores the flow of payments and 
restores the sovereign to good standing as a borrower. Other 
compositions look toward rehabilitation at a future date. Here the best 
interest lies in a composition that divides the surplus in a satisfactory 
way, assuming the creditors deem the surplus to be adequate . 
Whatever the situation, the composition that realizes the best interest 
of creditors will follow from creditor assent. The goal of any sovereign 
restructuring mechanism, therefore, should be to enable freely given 
creditor assent. 
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III. TOWARD MINIMAL BANKRUPTCY 
A. The Possible Regimes and the State of the Policy Debate 
In Part III ,  we use the economic principles explained in Part I I  
to  explain why the first of  the two major reform proposals, that of the 
IMF, has failed to win support from either the creditors or sovereign 
borrowers . We begin by setting out the range of proposals and the 
current state of the debate . 
Sovereign bankruptcy discussions contemplate four alternative 
states of the world: 
( 1) Full Bankruptcy. This regime would be modeled on Chapter 
1 1  of the United States Bankruptcy Code, but adjusted for the 
differences between the private and sovereign debt contexts . 76 Such a 
regime would have four b asic features. It would: (a) stay enforcement 
proceedings by creditors; (b) accord priority status to new debt 
financing extended during the bankruptcy proceeding; (c) provide for 
approval of a composition by a supermajority of creditors, trumping 
contracts with UACs ;  and (d) empower a judicial authority to cram 
down a composition on dissenting creditors and classes,  provided the 
composition met a substantive standard, in cases in which the 
supermajority approval was not met but a lower approval threshold 
was satisfied .77 
(2) Minimal Bankruptcy . This regime would eliminate any or 
all of three elements of full bankruptcy: the stay, the priority for new 
credit, and the cram down.7B Approval of the composition would 
76. For a summary of the differences between them, see Tarullo, supra note 9, at 633-35.  
For an expanded comparative perspective, see Patrick Bolton, Towards a Statutory Approach to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World 
(Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
77 .  For full bankruptcy proposals, see Benjamin J. Cohen, Developing-Country Debt: A 
Middle Way, ESSAYS INT'L FIN. No. 17 3 (1 989) .  See generally Kunibert Raffel', Applying Chapter 
9 Insolvency to International Debts: An Economically Efficient Solution with a Human Face, 18 
WORLD DEV. 301 (1990) (drawing insights from Chapter 9, the United States bankruptcy system 
for municipalities) . 
78. For an academic proposal in the minimal bankruptcy mode, see Steven L .  Schwarcz, 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 
980- 1 0 1 0  (2000). For variations on the theme in policy briefs, see Anne Krueger, New 
Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, Speech at the 
Institute for International Economics Conference on "Sovereign D ebt Workouts: Hopes and 
Hazards" (Apr. 1, 2002), http ://www.imf org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102 .htm; INT'L 
MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, �'ll 6 - 1 4 .  See also Christopher G. Oechsli, Procedural Guidelines 
for Renegotiating LDC Debts: An Analogy to Chapter 1 1  of the Us. Banl�ruptcy Reform Act, 2 1  
VA. J .  INT'L L. 305 (1981) ;  Jeffrey Sachs, Do We Need a n  International Lender o f  the Last Right?, 
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proceed under statutory rules, UACs would be superseded, and 
dissenters would be bound. There would be little incentive to hold out, 
unless a creditor had enough votes to block a maj ority. 
(3) Universal Collective Action Clauses. All sovereign bonds 
would have CACs .  No international bankruptcy regime would come 
into existence.79 
(4) Status Quo . Market actors would continue to exercise 
unfettered discretion in their contract drafting. 80 
The cutting edge of the policy debate lies between regimes (2) 
and (3) above.  Meanwhile ,  sovereign issuers and bondholders rej ect 
regime (2) and frequently express a preference for regime (4) , but have 
taken steps towards regime (3) . 81 
The case for a bankruptcy mandate took a step forward when 
Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, endorsed 
the idea in November 200 1 .82 Her proposal was criticized by 
sovereigns and their bondholders alike for giving the IMF too much 
control over future compositions . The IMF then went back to the 
drawing board, reemerging on April 1 ,  2002,  when Krueger laid out a 
more detailed proposal. The IMF made an emphatic move towards 
minimalism, offering a scheme featuring more creditor involvement 
and less IMF control. 83 
The IMF's proposal has become the salient statement of the 
minimal bankruptcy idea. Krueger argues that an international 
bankruptcy regime needs to perform five functions:  The procedure 
must provide (1) for confirmation by a supermaj ority vote of creditors, 
voting as one class across the range of the sovereign's debt 
instruments ; (2) for a stay of enforcement proceedings against the 
debtor; (3) for priority status (and exclusion from the stay) for credit 
extended to the debtor after commencement; (4) for a standstill of 
debtor payments to creditors other than those extending new credit ; 
Graham Lecture at Princeton University (Apr. 20, 1995) (on file with authors) . For a review of 
the literature, see ROGOFF & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 46. 
79. See Taylor, supra note 1 L  
80. In the economist's ideal world version of the status quo, there would be no more bail 
outs and, therefore, no moral hazard problems. 
8l. Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt, INT'L FIN. L.  REV. , 
May 2003, at 19 ,  20-2 1 ;  Dealing with Default, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2003, at 63, 64. 
82. Anne Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002:  A New Approach to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address at the National Economists Club Annual Members 
Dinner (Nov. 26, 2001) ,  http ://www. imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/1 1 260 l . htm [hereinafter 
Krueger, IFA: A New Approach] ; see also ANNE KRUEGER, INT'L MONETARY FUND, A NEW 
APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1 (2002), http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/exrp/s drm/eng/sdrm.pdf [hereinafter KRUEGER, A NEW ApPROACH] . 
83. See Krueger, supra note 78. 
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and (5) for reform of the debtor's economic policies. 84 The procedure 
would vest gatekeeper authority in the IMF. A distressed sovereign 
debtor would apply to the IMF for a standstill . The IMF would grant 
the standstill only if the debtor is acting in "good faith" and is 
committed to adjusting its debts. 85 Negotiation between the debtor, 
the preexisting creditors, and the IMF would then proceed inside the 
bankruptcy framework. A limited adjudicatory authority would be 
created that would not pass judgment on the substance of the plan, 
but would resolve disputes within the group of creditors. 
The contract versus mandate debate was j oined on April 2 ,  
2002,  when John Taylor, Undersecretary to the United States 
Treasury, refused to endorse the IMF proposal, asserting that contract 
reform remained the preferred mode for addressing the problem of 
sovereign default .86 If UACs were a problem, then the bondholders 
themselves ought to be willing to trade in their old bonds for 
substitutes containing CACs .  With the exchanges effected, debt could 
be restructured without the need for a bankruptcy process. 87 
The bankruptcy movement has paused while actors variously 
appraise the IMF proposal and the viability of the contractual 
alternative . The IMF itself professes to be considering the contractual 
alternative . 88 Indeed, internal IMF discussions respecting the design 
of a sovereign bankruptcy regime have been gravitating away from 
mandate and in the direction of creditor consent.89 On another front , 
actors working under G - 10  auspices have devised new CACs adequate 
to the task assigned by the Treasury . 90 Success for the contractual 
solution, however, depends on the voluntary participation of sovereign 
borrowers and lenders, and a significant segment of that community is 
skeptical . 91 The Treasury, apparently annoyed by the bondholders' 
84. See KRuEGER, A NEW APPROACH, supra note 82. 
85. Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 1 1 ; Krueger, IFA: A New Approach, supra note 82.  
86. See Taylor, supra note 1 1 . 
87. Id. 
88. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Board Discusses Possible Features at a 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (Jan. 7, 2003), http ://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/sec/pn/2003/pn0306.htm. 
89. See generally INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8. 
90. See GROUP OF TEN, REPORT OF THE G·10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, 
annex 1 (2002) , http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf. 
9 1 .  For early reports on the wariness of market participants about the various reform 
proposals, see Alan Beattie, Financial Groupings Want New Deb t  Rules, FIN. TIMES, June 12,  
2002,  at 12 ,  12  (reporting agreement among buyers and sellers on the sovereign bond markets 
over unattractiveness of the IMF's statutory reform proposal) ; James Tyson, European Nations 
Plan to Issue Sovereign Bonds with New Clauses, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 9, 2002 (reporting 
that while Germany, France, and thirteen other European countries are willing to introduce 
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failure to embrace its contractarian accommodation of their interests,  
responded with a public tilt in the direction of the IMF proposal .92 
This leaves the Treasury and the IMF occupying common ground, 
simultaneously (and ambiguously) entertaining the possibility of both 
approaches .  Even so, the Treasury's message to the bondholders 
seems clear enough : Get with our contractarian program or face 
something you will like even less.  These informal pressure tactics 
have yielded dividends, as Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, South Africa, and 
a half dozen other countries have begun experiments with CACs in 
their New York bonds . 93 
We appraise the IMF proposal here , deferring our appraisal of 
the Treasury's proposal to Part IV. Section B argues that the IMF 
proposal is not minimal enough. This discussion draws on Part II 's 
presentation of the incentive structure of sovereign lending 
relationships to assert that three of the proposal's features-the stay 
of enforcement, the grant of priority status for new loans , and the 
payment standstill-add little to the posture of a sovereign default 
under the status quo . The value that the IMF proposal adds, 
therefore,  differs little from the contractual proposal. Both seek 
majoritarian voting with the goal of facilitating bargaining and 
rehabilitation. The difference lies in the means to the end-where the 
Treasury would contract into CACs,  the IMF would mandate them .  
Section C expands o n  our argument for minimal bankruptcy by 
explaining why the IMF proposal appropriately omits two central 
features of the United States bankruptcy system-judicial fairness 
review of the reorganization plan and judicial cram down. 
CACs, the Group of 24-including India and Egypt-have rejected the idea of CACs) . The initial 
news on the proposals was not all bad though. Gradually, a critical mass of market actors came 
to support the inclusion of CACs in new issues. Whitney Debevoise,  The Debt  Crisis Debate, 
LATIN FIN . ,  Nov. 2002, at 52-54, http ://www.emta.org/keyper/partingshotfinal l .pdf; see New 
Option Arises for Future Bond Launch, GERTA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Sept. 18 ,  2002 (reporting 
Brazil's announced willingness to introduce CACs) . 
92. See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard, Enhancing Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address at IMF 
Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms (Jan. 22,  200 3) (Chairman of Council 
of Economic Advisers espousing contractarian approach while simultaneously endorsing the 
benefits of an organized restructuring process). 
93. John Barham, Coohing Up a New Solution, LATIN FIN . ,  June 2003,  at 10. As of the date 
of this writing, the list also included Canada, Turkey, Belize, Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela, 
and Korea. The exception to this trend was Israel, which used UACs in its New York law 
registration. For a recent report on this front, see INT'L MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON CRISIS RESOLUTION (2003) ,  
http ://www.imf.org/ExternallNP/pclrlcr/2003/eng/090503.pclf. 
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B. Not Minimal Enough 
Krueger describes the IMF proposal in terms of the creditors' 
best interests . She professes three objectives :  ( 1 )  providing incentives 
for more orderly and timely restructuring; (2) protecting asset values 
and creditors' rights ;  and (3) reducing the costs of disorderly 
workouts.94 Many third parties, we suspect, read the proposal as an 
attempt to cure the problems that the IMF encountered in the bailouts 
of the mid-1 990s.  On this view, the best interest of creditors takes a 
back seat to the IMF's immediate objectives-preventing contagion in 
the international credit markets and transferring the burden of 
restructuring to private creditors.95 
1 .  The Standstill and the Bail In 
The third-party view better describes the proposal's intended 
scope of operation. Consider the functions played by three of the 
proposal's components-the stay of enforcement proceedings , the 
standstill respecting payments, and the provision of priority for new 
loans . This trio is supposed to come into operation as distress ripens to 
default, encasing and ordering the process of emergency financing. 
The objective is to transform the bail out into a "bail in." Here is the 
scenario . First, the sovereign with a liquidity crisis goes to the IMF, 
which plays a gatekeeping role ,  distinguishing between applicants 
genuinely in crisis and applicants able to pay and seeking to use the 
bankruptcy safe space opportunistically. 96 Once the gate is opened 
and the sovereign enters the safe space,  the liquidity crisis is eased. 
Since a standstill is in effect, no default occurs and everyone stays 
calm. With no payments due immediately, an emergency loan from the 
IMF need not take first place on the agenda; instead, the preexisting 
creditors must come to the table and agree to give -ups.  Capital 
controls also may be needed at this early point, the theory being that 
capital controls imposed with IMF sanction and for a short period of 
time will have no perverse effects . Once the preexisting creditors take 
their haircut, the IMF makes its loan from a priority position. 
94. Krueger, supra note 78. 
95 .  Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 31 ,  at 190, ascribe a trio of objectives to the IMF: (1) see 
private creditors share the burden of restructuring; (2) confine the damage of distress, protecting 
the world economy; and (3) see that the international credit markets run smoothly. 
96 .  See Krueger, supra note 78. 
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Liquidity restored, the short-term bankruptcy ends . Combining the 
loan and the haircut, the debtor is creditworthy once ITlOre .97 
This sounds reasonable , but questions arise about credibility 
and perverse effects. The standstill is supposed to obviate the nee d  to 
avoid default with new borrowing, but, in substance, standstill and 
default are the same thing. The literature points to only one point of 
difference . Standstill imports a freeze on interest accruals98 where 
interest continues to accrue during the period of default under the 
debt contracts as written. This distinction does not impress us. That 
the interest meter stops clicking due to a statutory mandate does not 
make a default any less of a default. Nor does it change the final 
payment outcome . In the present system, the sovereign ready to 
return to the credit markets negotiates a payment schedule for less 
than the full amount. Interest accruals during the default appear 
primarily as numbers in the page of rights to be scaled down. Their 
existence is unlikely to make a difference in the negotiation's outcome.  
The standstill provision speaks more to liquid capital nervously 
poised to exit the distressed j urisdiction than to the unpaid creditors .  
Here the bankruptcy regime blesses the default with a legal sanction. 
But it is not clear why, as between the status quo and the 
hypothesized new regime, a different behavior pattern follows for 
nervous capital that readily can be transferred to other national 
venues .  Capital controls aside, the aspect of the program most likely 
to maintain calm in fluid capital markets is the prospect of an IMF 
emergency credit facility.99 But the incentive structure implicit in the 
proposal does not hold out an ex ante IMF commitment. Instead, the 
preexisting creditors must make their give-ups under a threat that 
IMF credit will be withheld. Any doubt on this score would be resolved 
by capital flight, necessitating capital controls. It is hard to see how a 
standstill declaration makes a difference.  
Nor is it clear that preexisting creditors will agree to a quick 
haircut. In the past, creditors have been incidental beneficiaries of 
IMF emergency credit. If the IMF is going to make the loans anyway, 
whether for political reasons or due to concerns about the 
international financial system ,  then bondholders are better off holding 
97. The closest analogue in practice is the prepackaged bankruptcy, an out-of-court 
composition closed through Chapter 1 1  in order to take advantage of the Chapter's majority 
voting scheme. Section 1 126(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 1 1  U.S .C.  § 1 126(b) (2000), permits an 
issuer to conduct a binding vote on a plan of reorganization prior to filing for bankruptcy. In 
addition, 11 U.S .C .  § 1 1 2 1 (a) allows a debtor to file a plan with its chapter 11 petition. 
98. See Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 1 1 .  
99. ld. at 80-83.  
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out as a group.  On the other hand, in cases like those of Ecuador and 
Ukraine, where default carries no negative systemic threat and 
emergency credit has been withheld, the IMF has a credible 
bargaining position. But the IMF has that bargaining position 
whether or not the negotiation is encased in a formal bankruptcy 
proceeding.  Of course, the standstill stops the payment stream and 
pressures the lenders, but an old fashioned default does that as well . 
Moreover, the longer the standstill stays in place, the emergency 
proceeding designed to avert a liquidity crisis looks more like a 
conventional , drawn out sovereign default . As such, it hardly would 
have the effect of restoring confidence and preventing contagion . 
The IMF's transmogrification of a "default" into "standstill ," 
therefore ,  seems unlikely to persuade either nervous capitalists or the 
lending community that financial distress is not financial distress.  
Capital, not recharacterization, cures distress,  leaving the IMF in 
more or less the same position with or without a bankruptcy process .  
2.  Priority Lending 
At present, the IMF effectively receives priority treatment from 
its members-borrowers. Unlike private sovereign lenders, the IMF 
does not consent to reductions of its payment rights . And, unlike 
private lenders, it almost always gets paid. loo The IMF's priority 
proposal , lOl  then, merely formalizes and sanctions the present 
practice, much like its standstill proposal, and would Inake a 
difference only if used to facilitate new financing with private credit in 
a manner similar to debtor-in-possession financing in corporate 
bankruptcies .  This use, however,  creates an appearance of conflict 
with one of the basic tenets of the reputation theory of sovereign debt. 
Recall that once the default occurs and the lenders are waiting for 
recovery, the sovereign retains a repayment incentive only to the 
extent that no third party lender appears on
· 
the scene holding out a 
new credit line. The IMF priority lending proposal effectuates j ust 
that result. 102 
In other words, the extant creditors will not always want the 
distressed sovereign to have access to fresh priority lending. It follows 
that the incumbent creditors will want to decide on new priority loans 
100. STIGLITZ, supra note 10,  at 226.  
101 .  See also INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8 ,  � 72.  
102 .  The priority lending proposal, like the CAC proposal, requires a mandate that overrides 
existing sovereign debt contracts. The contracts contain "pari passu" clauses which make 
priorities ineffective. See sup ra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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themselves .  In many cases ,  one would expect such consent to be 
forthcoming readily, as all the creditors benefit when new financing 
helps bring the sovereign's economy out of distress . 103 So long as the 
debtor retains a good faith commitment to resuming debt service at 
the earliest opportunity, a priority emergency credit function should 
not prove deleterious to the interests of the creditors as a whole .  But 
one should not expect approval in all cases. New priority loans hold 
out risks to preexisting creditors . If the loan proceeds are badly 
managed and the new capital does not assist the recovery process , but 
instead, say, flows out of the country, then a priority credit facility 
worsens the position of preexisting creditors .  
We question whether IMF assumption of authority to decide on 
new priority private lending should be included in a sovereign 
bankruptcy regime. It does not serve the purpose of solving a collective 
action problem. Of course, new financing could hasten the sovereign's 
economic recovery. But the IMF's proposal merely shifts authority 
from the creditors : Bond contracts already allow for the preexisting 
creditors to permit fresh priority lending with a vote of either a simple 
majority or two-thirds majority of the bondsJo4 Since the IMF's 
agenda often diverges from that of the creditors, this shift of authority 
respecting priority private credit to the IMF would not be in the best 
interest of the creditors. 105 
3. The Stay 
The IMF, still following the corporate template , includes a stay 
of enforcement in its sovereign bankruptcy proposal . 106 In the private 
context, the stay is essential . Direct creditor enforcement against 
going concern assets tends to be value destructive, and the whole 
purpose of corporate reorganization is the enhancement of going 
concern value. It is less clear what benefits redound from a stay in the 
sovereign context. At least one commentary suggests that it should be 
dispensed with . 107 We agree ,  even as we note that the matter remains 
arguable. 
103.  For a statement of  the importance of  new priority financing in respect of  sovereign 
recovery, see Bolton, supra note 76. 
104. For an explication, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the 
Collective Will, 51 EMORy L.J. 1 3 1 7 , 1 345-46 (2002) . 
105. This position recently has garnered support within the IMF. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, 
supra note 8, �� 1 69-77 (proposing that new priority private loans require approval of 75 percent 
of the preexisting creditors) . 
106. Krueger, IFA: A New Approach, supra note 82. 
107.  Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 984-85. 
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Direct enforcement of sovereign debt is the exception and not 
the rule .  Even the enforcement model of sovereign debt claims only 
that creditors use indirect means to inflict costs on defaulting 
sovereigns.  We suspect the stay has found its way into the IMF 
proposal in order to address a residual threat of enforcement by 
vulture funds . This came to the attention of the international financial 
community as the result of an incident in June 2000. 108 Peru was in 
the process of executing a payment promise made pursuant to a 
composition reached with its creditors. Funds intended for holders of 
European issues were dispatched in banking channels. A hedge fund 
that had been a holdout from the composition managed to identify, in 
Belgium, monies headed to Frankfurt. The fund procured an 
attachment from a Belgian judge, ruling ex parte . The legal theory 
was that the payment violated a covenant of the original bond 
contract, which still governed the bonds belonging to the holdout . 
Whether or not the theory would have held up in a more 
knowledgeable court , 109 the ploy worked. Peru caved in and paid the 
vultures in full rather than have a settlement already reached with 
the vast majority of its creditors disrupted by a drawn out legal 
proceeding. 
Since then, the threat of disruptive enforcement actions by 
holdout creditors has been repeatedly offered to justify both a 
sovereign bankruptcy regime and UAC reform. l lo Although the threat 
has been utilized effectively in at least two other instances,  I I I  its 
108. For a fuller description of the incident, see G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign 
Piracy, 56 BuS. LAW. 635,  635-36 (200 1) .  See also Eric Lindenbaum & Alicia Duran, Debt 
Restructuring: Legal Considerations, EMERGING MARKETS RES. (Merrill Lynch & Co. Global 
Securities Research & Economics Group, New York, N.Y.) ,  Oct. 30, 2000, at 1 -3 .  
109 .  See Gulati & Klee,  supra note 108, at  63 6-37,  65 1 (arguing that the  argument was 
infirm) ; Letter from Charles H. Dallara, Managing Director, Institute of International Finance, 
to the Honorable Gordon Brown, Chairman of the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee (Apr. 9, 2002) (stating that the consensus of legal experts is that the interpretation of 
the pari passu clause in Elliott v .  Peru (Elliott Assocs. ,  L.P. ,  General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 
(Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000» was incorrect and suggesting a 
strategy for reversing that interpretation), http ://www.iif.com/data/publiclicdc0402 .pdf. 
1 10 .  Most prominently, the actions of Elliott featured in Anne Krueger's speech on November 
26, 200 1 at the National Economists' Club, where she discussed the IMF's statutory proposal. 
See Krueger, IFA: A New Approach, supra note 82. 
I l l .  See Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seat ing Chart for Sovereign Restructuring, 54 
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2004) (discussing both the pari passu cases) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with authors). The attempt to utilize the pari passu argument has also failed in one 
instance. See I\:ensington Int'l, Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 2002 No. 1088 (Commercial Court, 
Apr. 16, 2003), aff'd, 2003 WL 1935 493 (CA May 13 ,  2003).  As of this writing, the most recent 
case, against Nicaragua, has yielded an initial decision for the vulture creditors and has an 
appeal pending. See Angela Pruitt, Nicaragua Creditor Suit Muddles Sovereign Restructuring, 
Dow ,JONES CAP. MARKETS REP . , Sept. 29, 2003. 
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gravity is questionable .  Peru was jumped unawares In Belgium. It 
seems unlikely that many nations making payments in respect of a 
composition (or otherwise in a state of default) will be taken unawares 
in the future . Payment channels can be structured so that neither the 
sovereign nor its agents is the titleholder to any monies passing 
through unsafe territory, to the extent that passage through unsafe 
territory is necessary at all . 1 I2 Consider this in regard to actions by 
Argentina in 200 1 ,  at a time of imminent default. Argentina and the 
IMF worried about creditor enforcement actions in the United States ,  
where the Argentine government's bank reserves were sited. The 
expedient was simple.  The monies were transferred to the Bank for 
International Settlements in Basle, 1 13 apparently a safe space . The 
implication is that with advance planning, direct judicial enforcement 
against sovereigns has limited utility. No easy sovereign analog exists 
to the private law race to the courthouse. 
On the contrary side, the enforcement model of sovereign debt 
can be drawn on to support a stay. As enforcement proceeds indirectly 
under the model, the sovereign incurs the costs of husbanding its 
assets so as to frustrate direct enforcement. l 14 It follows that a stay 
could assist the rehabilitation process,  even if attachments are few 
and far between. 1 1 5 The stay frees up the sovereign to engage in cross 
border transactions without incurring the costs of subterfuge. To the 
extent the enforcement model identifies costs, a stay imports benefits 
to the sovereign. 
Whether an appropriate balance of enforcement costs and 
performance incentives would result from a stay is a more difficult 
question: Would the IMF's proposal make sovereign default overly 
attractive? The IMF in its gatekeeper role says "trust us." But it is 
not clear that the IMF, in its stabilizing role, would manage the gate 
in a way that maximizes the sovereign's incentives to pay its debts.  
A final point that might cause suspicion towards the IMF 
proposal is that, to a considerable extent, creditors already have 
1 1 2 .  Had Peru paid at home, in Peru, its bondholders would have been transferring amongst 
themselves in unsafe banking channels. 
1 1 3. Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 89. 
1 14.  See supra text accompanying notes 39·44. 
1 1 5 .  The latest reports are that numerous bondholder suits have been filed against 
Argentina ,  at least some of them hoping to use the arguments made by Elliott against Peru. See 
Pamela Druckerman, Frustrated Argentine Bondholders Try Suing-Ambition Is To Seize Assets 
or at Least Gain Leverage; Why Managers Wait, WALL ST. J . ,  Aug. 23, 2002, at A6, 2002 WL-WSJ 
3404256; see also Aaron Lucchetti & Jonathan Karp, Billionaire 's Award May Snag Progress on 
Argentine Debt ,  WALL ST. J . ,  Sept. 22 ,  2003, at Cl (reporting on a $700 million judgment 
awarded to Kenneth Dart in his suit against Argentina),  2003 WL-WSJ 3980356. 
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collective control over maverick creditor lawsuits . Maverick lawsuits 
with the highest potential to cause a sovereign meaningful pain are 
those for accelerated amounts (as opposed to those for an individual 
creditor's missed coupon payment) . An acceleration, however, typically 
needs to be authorized by 2 5  percent of the creditors .  And once 
authorized, it can be reversed by a simple majority vote .  1 16  
We doubt creditors believe that this segment of the IMF's plan 
will solve either coordination or hold out problems .  It merely shifts 
authority from the creditors to the IMF; authority the creditors would 
rather retain. These points appear to be getting through to the IMF, 
as demonstrated  in recent internal discussions .  It is considering 
removing itself from the gatekeeper role .  Memb ers in distress would 
instead activate the bankruptcy process by representing that their 
debt had become unsustainable . 1 17 The IMF also is considering 
dispensing with the automatic stay in favor of a requirement for a 
three-quarters majority creditor vote . 1 1S 
C. Majority Voting, Cramdown, and Fairness Review 
Even though we question many provisions of the IMF 
bankruptcy proposal, we believe it takes a step forward when it leaves 
the determination of the fairness of the composition (the "plan" in 
United States bankruptcy terminology) to the creditors, relegating any 
adjudicatory authority within the system to a secondary role. Any 
"cram down" of a restructuring plan thus would follow from the action 
of a majority of the bondholders' peers rather tha n  from a judge. 1 l9 
The omission of the judicial cram down will come as a jolt to 
observers steeped in United States bankruptcy practice .  Chapters 9 
and 1 1  of the United States Bankruptcy Code both provide for 
substantive review of the composition for fairness by a federal judge as 
a precondition to giving it binding effect on dissenting creditors . 12o 
l l 6 .  For an explication, see Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 104,  at 1 330- 3 l .  
l l 7 .  This creates a problem respecting the case o f  a member with sustainable debt that 
triggers the process opportunistically. Various alternative approaches are under consideration .  
See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8 ,  � �  84-92. 
l l 8 . Id. �� 124-38, 167. Any creditor receiving proceeds of an e nforcement action would have 
its bankruptcy payout proportionately reduced. Id. � 133 .  
l l 9. See Schwarcz, s upra note 78 ,  at 1 003-09. Schwarcz stops just short of  leaving out the 
judge, suggesting that judicial cram down be held in reserve to be added to the system in case 
the creditors fail to agree to compositions. Krueger, supra note 78, takes the additional step , 
separating the judge from the approval process, and limiting the j udge to intercreditor dispute 
resolution. 
1 20. 11 U .S .C .  §§ 943(b), 1 1 29(a) (2000) . 
2004] SOVEREIGN DEBT REFORM 37 
How could dispensing with judicial review enhance the attractiveness 
of the process to the creditors? The exercise of working through the 
answers to this question reveals the strengths of the IMF's minimal 
bankruptcy scheme, even as it identifies some additional weaknesses .  
1 .  The Best Interest of  Creditors as  a Judicial Standard 
The IMF could articulate a fairness standard. Under this 
Article's analysis, the "best interest of creditors" suggests itself as a 
suitable standard for both simplicity and economic sensitivity. The 
standard is easily stated: A composition realizes the best interest of 
creditors when the creditors freely assent to it, induced by the fair 
division of an adequate surplus.  Applying the standard presents more 
difficulties . This determination lies in classic "business judgment" 
territory. It is the creditors who know what rehabilitates the borrower 
as creditworthy. It is the creditors who have the handle on the 
magnitude of the surplus under negotiation . It is the creditors who 
best know the difference between fairness and greed when the surplus 
is divided at the negotiating table.  Given this, vesting the decision in 
the hands of an adjudicator suggests an ulterior, distributive motive.  
Even if the subj ect matter was more justiciable, it is hard to 
envision an actor who could determine the best interest of creditors 
and impose that judgment on classes of dissenting creditors without 
the risk of losing the confidence of actors in the credit markets . The 
distributive, and hence political, consequences of this decision may be 
of too great a magnitude for technocratic treatment. Even the 
selection of the decision maker would present a public choice problem. 
The IMF, the prima facie candidate, has, among other problems, 
disqualifying financial stakes in the subj ect m atter. Experts could be 
recruited, but would the context import sufficient reputational 
constraints to prevent their falling prey to influence activities? 12 1 
The creditors justifiably fear a tilted playing field-a 
bankruptcy process that serves the purposes of the IMF and the 
debtor, siphoning surplus to rehabilitation and repaying the IMF 
rather than paying the creditors. The IMF appropriately alleviates 
these suspicions by vesting decision-making authority in the creditors 
themselves .  
1 2 1 .  Significantly, the IMF's proposal envisions an adjudicatory authority only for process 
questions, claim validation, and intercreditor dispute resolution. INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra 
note 8, �� 227-73.  
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2 .  United States Bankruptcy Compared 
In the United States bankruptcy context, fairness standards 
protect the creditors .  In theory, the judge reviews the plan to prevent 
wealth transfers in the debtor's direction. For example , consider the 
"best interest of creditors" standard of Chapter 9, which governs 
municipal bankruptcy. 122 With municipal reorganization, as with 
sovereign default, 123 liquidation is not an option and local politics 
create a prima facie possibility of strategic default . In addition, the 
taxpayers are parties in interest; thus, Chapter 9 gives them a special 
right to appear and obj ect to the plan. 124 The Chapter 9 process 
protects taxpayer interests in other ways as well : The creditors are not 
accorded the right to demand that municipal services be cut back so as 
to return the debtor to solvency; municipal officials retain some 
discretion to determine the effects of additional tax on community 
welfare . 125 This does not, at first blush, seem creditor protective.  But 
creditor concessions respecting the tax burden are as unavoidable in 
the municipal context as they are in sovereign context . 126 Citizens of a 
city are mobile, at least when compared to citizens of sovereign 
nations .  If the municipal tax b urden becomes excessive, the citizens 
most able to pay the taxes will move someplace else . 127 Although a 
city cannot be liquidated, an excessive tax burden imposed for the 
benefit of creditors can destroy the city. 128 As a result, even though 
the defaulting city conceivably could pay the creditors in full in the 
long run (just like a defaulting sovereign) , the Chapter 9 fairness 
standard contemplates that the creditors may be asked to scale back 
their rights. Accordingly, the municipal "best interest of creditors" 
standard does not contemplate payment in full. Just how much the 
122. 1 1  U.S .C .  § 943(b)(7) (2000) . 
123 .  Raffel', supra note 77 ,  at 305 - 1 0 ,  works through the analogy in detail. 
124 .  1 1  U.S .C .  § 943(a) (2000) . 
125 .  See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C .  Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy,  60 U.  CHI. L .  REV. 425, 466-67 ( 1 993); see also West Coast 
Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist . ,  144 F . 2 d  654, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1 940) (ruling plan to be 
fair when providing for payments "that could reasonably be expected in all the circumstances") . 
126 .  See supra text accompanying notes 52 -53 .  
127 .  See Tarullo, supra note 9 ,  at  637 -38 .  
128.  Chapter 9 i s  nonetheless quite protective of  the creditors' interest. The high possibility 
of strategic default makes it relatively hard for a city to invoke its protection. Under 1 1  U.S .C .  § 
109(c) , a filing municipality must be insolvent, it must desire to effect a plan, and it must have 
either (1 )  obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in a mount of the claims 
of each class, (2) have attempted to negotiate with its creditors unsuccessfully, (3) be able to 
show that negotiation was impracticable, or (4) reasonably believe that a creditor was attempting 
to gain a preference. 
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creditors may be  required to  give up is  left to  negotiation, subject to 
the best interest standard and the requirement that the plan be 
feasible . 129 At this point, creditor protection comes to the fore. The 
best interest of creditors and feasibility standards collapse into a 
unitary inquiry. As applied, the standards look to the city's ability to 
pay: Its revenues and expenditures are compared, with the court 
taking into account the city's taxing power and the possibility of tax 
increases . l3o The bondholders are paid all that could reasonably be  
expected in  the circumstances. 131 
Significantly, the Chapter 9 fairness standard applies even 
though a m ajority of creditors already has approved the plan after 
being presented a disclosure document vetted by the court. 132 The 
fairness test is in addition to the vote. The drafter of Chapter 9, in the 
tradition of the United States law of corporate reorganization, 
assumes that creditors' collective action problems make them 
vulnerable to bad deals . On this scenario, insiders with private 
agendas, whether agents of the defaulting municipality or agents of 
financial intermediaries, can skew the deal to the creditors' detriment . 
The creditors, deprived by the stay of cash flows for an extended 
length of time, approve any deal that releases cash, even if an arms 
length negotiator would have rejected the deal out of hand. The 
fairness standard brings in a judge at the final stage to double check 
the bargaining result from the creditors' point of view. 
The assumptions underlying this story of creditor vulnerability 
have come into question. Institutions have replaced individuals as the 
leading bondholders . u3 In the corporate distress context, they have 
been shown to be capable of surmounting collective action problems 
and saying "no" to an unsatisfactory offer from a distressed debtor. 134 
129.  Id. § 943(b)(7) . 
130. See Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist. ,  3 1 9  U.S.  4 1 5, 419-22 (1 943) . 
1 3 l .  See West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist . ,  1 1 4  F.2d 654, 678 (9th Cir. 
1940) . For further discussion, see McConnell & Picker, supra note 125, at 464-67.  
132. See § 1 1 24. 
133. Kahan, supra note 66,  at 1060-62 n . 104, drawing on the last reported data on United 
States corporate bond ownership (from 1995), reports that households own only 15  percent of 
outstanding corporate bonds, while holding 41 percent of outstanding equities. He also reports 
that institutional bond owners are considerably more concentrated than institutional 
stockholders. Id. at 1061 -62.  The five largest holders often own 25 percent of an outstanding 
issue and a majority can be made up of the largest twenty to fifty holders .  Id. 
1 34 .  Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose fro m  Junh Bond Covenant 
Changes ?, 66 J. Bus. 499, 512  (1 993); see also Lewis S.  Peterson, Note , Who 's Being Greedy? A 
Theoretical and Empirical Exmnination of Holdouts and Coercion in Debt  Tender and Exchange 
Offers, 103 YALE L.J.  505, 5 1 3  (1 993) (arguing that creditors, by organizing and making credible 
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The same generally should be the case in the international context . 135 
One might argue, therefore, that fairness review can be jettisoned in 
the sovereign context. 
But there remains an argument for retaining fairness review in 
the United States bankruptcy context. The United States 
reorganization rules, under both Chapter 9 and the corporate section, 
Chapter 1 1 , 136 never actually require approval by a maj ority of the 
creditors,  whether simple, absolute, or super. In both Chapter 9 and 
Chapter 1 1 ,  creditors divide themselves into multiple classes in 
accordance with their priorities and other contract rights .  No 
particular class structure is imposed. The general creditors,  for 
example, could be organized in one class, or divided into a series of 
classes of general creditors with particular affinities, such as trade 
creditors, bondholders, short term noteholders, and subordinated 
debentureholders . 137 When the debtor presents a plan of 
reorganization, approval is done on a class-by-class basis by maj ority 
vote (a vote of two-thirds of the creditors in the class by number, one­
half of the total dollar amount of claims) . The plan proceeds to a j udge 
for substantive review, provided that a single class has approved it by 
majority vote . There is no requirement that the approving class hold 
any particular minimum percentage of aggregate claims much less a 
majority of claims. The result is that a plan can pass the voting stage 
with the approval of only a small minority of creditors .  
Gerrymandering in class formation therefore emerges a s  a n  important 
strategic skill in bankruptcy proceedings . 138 
Given the infirmities in the operative mode of democratic 
decision making, it follows that a plan under Chapter 9 or 1 1  must 
satisfy a list of substantive criteria . Under Chapter 9, the best interest 
of creditors is the test . 139 The Chapter 1 1  criteria include a three-part 
fairness test. One part of the test keys into contracted-for priorities .  
commitments to rej ect tender and exchange offers can prevent firms from making coercive 
offers) .  
. 
135 .  That Argentina had a large number of retail bondholders (particularly in Japan and 
Germany) , however, suggests that the story about institutional holders is not universally true. 
136. Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 9 7 1 · 1010 ,  provides a more extensive treatment of Chapter 
l 1 's pertinence to international bankruptcy. Our discussion has a limited purpose. 
137. See 11 U .S .C .  § 1 1 02(b) . 
138.  The most famous examples are "new value" cases involving single purpose real estate 
corporations. The debtor allied itself with a separate class of unsecured creditors owed a small 
amount to attempt to cram down a plan of reorganization on dissenting secured creditor with a 
claim greater than the value of the real estate asset. The definitive case rejecting the ploy is 
Banh of America National Trust & Savings Ass 'n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 
U.S. 434, 437, 454-58 ( 1 999) .  
139 .  1 1  U .S .C .  § 943(b) (7) (2000). 
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Another part o f  the test sets a minimum recovery floor. 140 The third 
part of the test is a bar against unfair discrimina tion . 1 4 1  This holds 
out the possibility that an obj ecting creditor could stop a plan 
departing from the norm of pari passu treatment of creditors of equal 
priority, 1 42 with a result of horizontal equity trumping maj ority or 
even supermajority rule.  A plan with majority support can still be 
unfair to a particular dissenter, whether due to collusion between the 
debtor and a creditor coalition or to self-interested terms inserted by a 
creditor coalition acting unilaterally. 
3. Implications for Sovereign Bankruptcy 
This exposition of fairness review under Chapters 9 and 1 1  has 
implications for sovereign bankruptcy. If majority-approved 
compositions are imposed on dissenting minorities  without a fairness 
check, then the voting process rises to paramount importance in the 
proceeding's allocational politics .  The IMF proposal reflects an 
understanding of this when it suggests that all claimants be grouped 
in a single class to approve the plan by a single supermajority vote . 143 
This bypasses the United States practice of voting by classes . 
Presumably, the number of votes per claimant will vary with the 
amount of the claim. For voting purposes, other distinctions among 
the creditors would be stripped away, including distinctions that loom 
large in private bankruptcies ,  such as secured versus unsecured and 
senior versus subordinated status. This should not present a problem 
1 40 .  The first part applies to dissenting classes. § 1 1 29(a) (8) . The second part applies to 
dissenting creditors individually. Id. § 1 129(a)(7). Ea�h part addresses the value received by the 
dissenters under the plan. When a class as a whole rejects the plan, the plan fails the test if (a) 
the dissenting class receives anything less than the full value of its claim and (b) any class junior 
to the dissenting class receives any proceeds under the plan. Id. § 1 1 29(b) (2) . This is the absolute 
priority rule. It is  applied by reference to the going concern value of the reorganizing firm: If the 
firm's value exceeds the amount necessary to pay the dissenting class in full, there will be room 
to allow junior creditors to get some payment on their claims. 
Under the second part, dissent by an individual creditor defeats the plan if the plan provides 
the creditor anything less than the amount the creditor would receive if  the firm were liquidated. 
Id. § 1 129(a)(7). 
1 4 l .  Id. § 1 1 29(b)(1) .  
1 42 .  Note that the case law does not require strict p a r i  passu. treatment. See In r e  Aztec Co . ,  
107 B .R .  585 ,  589-90 (Bankr. M . D .  Tenn. 1 989) (setting out a four part test) .  
143.  See Krueger, supra note 78; see also I T'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8 ,  � �  165-75 .  
The IMF proposal would combine the aggregate voting approach, on a three quarters majority 
vote of all claims, together with a class organization structure for purposes of negotiation of the 
terms of the reorganization bargain. In the authors' contemplation, a plan could treat different 
classes differently so long as it garnered the requisite aggregate vote . 
42 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 57 : 1 
in the sovereign context. Secured and subordinated lending are rare; 
only official sector creditors like the IMF claim priority status . 144 
The question, which we take up later, is whether material 
intercreditor conflicts of interest, washed out at the voting stage, 
nevertheless could influence the terms of the composition. Note that 
the IMF proposal does contemplate an adjudicatory authority that 
addresses intercreditor disputes . 145 But the problems the IMF 
specifies for adjudication concern only ex ante contract rights­
matters like preferential payments, the prohibition of which are 
fundamental to bankruptcy jurisprudence . Our question, instead, goes 
to ex post relationships rather than ex ante rights . 146 Conflicts of 
interest can arise within groups of creditors ,  leading to differing views 
about the best interest of the group . Creditors that are nationals of the 
sovereign (whether individuals or firms) may see things differently 
than foreign creditors .  Similarly, creditors with continuing lending 
relationships with the sovereign may view plan terms differently from 
creditors intending to exit . Majority rule addresses the problem only 
by reference to the numbers . If conflicts taint only small numbers of 
creditors, the plan's integrity should not be affected. But if special 
interests encompass a majority or near majority, problems of 
discrimination could arise. The IMF's present proposal holds out no 
means to address this problem. 
D. Summary 
The IMF proposal appears to follow from deductive reasoning. 
At the starting point lies the cluster of incentive problems the IMF 
encountered in its 1 990s bailouts .  These problems are then taken to 
the corporate bankruptcy template. There the IMF planner selects 
instruments that might help.  The problem is that the creditors would 
rather keep many of these instruments for themselves .  In addition, 
144. See Gelpern, supra note 1 1 1 , at  1 1 - 19 (describing sovereign debt contracting practice, 
including the informal nature of prioritization) . But significant distinctions remain. Different 
issues of debt have different interest rates and durations, factors impacting significantly on their 
market values. But these intercreditor differences are ignored in United States bankruptcy 
practice .  
145 .  Krueger, supra note 78.  
146 .  The subsequent discussion in I NT'L MON ETARY FUND, supra note 8, � �  1 55-64, mentions 
intercreditor disputes without clearly specifying a source of authority for their determination. 
Both creditors committees and the system's adjudicatory authority are mentioned. The Report is 
also unclear on the question of what law would apply. See icl. � 264 (mandating application of 
"relevant national law" to substantive disputes and the dispute resolution forum's "own law" for 
procedural issues) . 
2004] SOVEREIGN DEBT REFORM 43 
these grants of authority to the IMF do not themselves solve creditor 
collective action problems.  
What happens when the hypothesized scenario fails to play out 
and the standstill imports no rapid relief? One suspects that the 
process would be deployed to pressure creditors to facilitate relief by 
making extraordinary give ups .  In other words, there is the danger 
that the IMF will use the tools of the bankruptcy scheme to effectuate 
its agenda and not that of the creditors . In light of that possibility, a 
rational creditor might prefer the status quo, where relief is not rapid, 
but patience and an upturn in the business cycle can return the 
sovereign to health. Thus rehabilitated in the fullness of time, the 
sovereign returns to its creditors to make a more favorable deal. The 
IMF's omission of judicial cram down becomes all the more important 
on this extended distress scenario . The creditors must be left free  to 
say "no" and wait it out . 1 47 
IV. THE UNANIMOUS ACTION/COLLECTIVE ACTION PUZZLE 
All sides came into the crises of the 1 990s sharing the 
assumption that the shift from bank lending to bond issuance 
implicated intractable coordination problems. This assumption 
followed from experiences in the debt crises of the 1980s, when 
restructuring procedures were disorderly, even with long-term players 
at the table and norms of cooperation in play. Hundreds of creditors 
with disparate views had to be brought into line, and UACs 
complicated this task. 148 Composition was achieved only with official 
sector intervention and years of negotiation. The small amount of 
bonded debt was put off to one side , and allowed to escape from 
restructuring on the theory that bondholder coordination was too hard 
to procure . 149 The assumption that bondholders with UACs could not 
be brought to agreement on compositions benefited the bondholders in 
the bailouts , as they stood to one side collecting the proceeds of 
emergency loans. 
These assumptions changed after 1999 when Pakistan, 
Ecuador, and Ukraine successfully concluded compositions with 
147. A term the proposal omits also looms large on this scenario-the superma]onty 
approval percentage. The creditors will want a number above three·quarters majority used in 
British contracts; the proposal's promoters will want a number below it. 
1 48. See Michael M. Chamberlin, Revisiting the IMF's Sovereign Bankruptcy Proposal and 
the Quest for More Orderly Sovereign Work-Outs, Remarks at the Institute for International 
Economics Conference "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards" (Apr. 2, 2002), 
http ://www . em tao org/ndevelop/rid 7 mac. pdf. 
149. See Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 3 1 ,  at 1 9 0 .  
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dispersed bondholder participation. These compositions were of the 
preemptive variety, 150 mooted as exchange offers, and successfully 
closed before liquidity problems became serious. Vulture investors did 
not disturb the proceedings . There was value on offer in the 
compositions and the vultures accepted it instead of holding out for 
more . 15 1 The success of these initiatives surprised the bond market: In 
response to the closing of the Pakistan composition, borrowing costs of 
other countries (countries with no significant economic connections to 
Pakistan) increased by twenty-five to ninety-five basis points . 1 52 
Now that the era of bondholder immunity from restructuring is 
over, the IMF argues that bondholders need a fair and predictable 
process in which to bargain over compositions . The IMF points out 
that exchange offers exploit bondholder coordination problems, 
skewing the field of contract in the debtor's favor.  The debtor, seeking 
to maximize its bargaining power, presents the compositions on a 
take-it -or-leave-it basis, after brief consultation with only a handful of 
large bondholders . 153 For the most part, no "collaborative dialogue" 
occurs . 154 A bankruptcy regime would offer a committee structure that 
would make such negotiations feasible. 
The United States Treasury rejected these arguments and took 
the lead in advocating a contractual alternative (and for a time even 
blocked attempts by other members of the G-7 to issue stronger words 
of support for the IMF plan) . 155 Like the bankruptcy proponents, the 
contractarians recognize a need for concerted action within the 
international financial community, but they focus on the need for a 
150. See Punam Chuham & Federico Sturzenegger, Default Episodes in the 1 990s:  What 
Have We Learned? 26-27, http://www .utdt.edu/-fsturzenlchuhanfinal .pdf (Nov. 24, 2003);  supra 
text accompanying note 57 .  
1 5 1 .  Argentina also closed a large preemptive exchange in 200 1 .  This was a voluntary 
operation, eschewing the coercive device of the exit consent. Approximately one third of 
Argentina's debt was exchanged, amounting to one half of eligible bonds. Ninety percent of 
Argentina's retail European investors exchanged. ADAM LERRICK & ALLAN H. M ELTZER, 
CARNEGIE M ELLON GAlLLIOT CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, SOVEREIGN DEFAULT: THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
CAN RESOLVE BANKRUPTCY WITHOUT A FORMAL COURT 4 (Apr. 2002), 
http://www.emcreditors .com/pdf/n_JEC%20Sov%20Bankruptcy%20Study%20.pdf 
152 .  Matthew R. McBrady & Mark S. Seasholes, Bailing-In 4 (Dec. 20, 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors) . 
153.  INT'L MONETARY FUND, INVOLVING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE RESOLUTION OF 
FINANCIAL CRISES-RESTRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN BONDS 14 - 16  (200 1) .  
154 .  See Krueger, supra note 78. 
155 .  See Taylor, supra note 1 1 .  Although Taylor's position in April 2002 appeared to be an 
outright rejection of the IMF's statutory proposal, the Treasury's stance appears to have softened 
to one of considering both proposals (while still favoring the contractual approach) . See Michael 
M. Phillips, Sllpport Builds for Plan to Ease Debt Loads of Developing Nations, WALL ST. J . ,  
Sept. 17 , 2002, a t  A16 .  
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transition from UACs to CACs .  As we have seen, UACs make it hard 
to garner creditor assent to a composition. Bankruptcy proponents 
argue that this strengthens the case for mandatory intervention. 
Contractarians reverse this argument, drawing on two assumptions : 
First, compositions in theory create value; and second, UACs in theory 
benefit only opportunists who hold up rational creditors who seek 
access to the value created. Given both assumptions, the bondholders 
should be willing to exchange their UAC bonds for CAC bonds. All one 
need do is make a public offer of the new CAC bonds and let the 
market price them.l56 The price will, in any event, exceed that of the 
VAC bonds, inducing across-the-board exchanges by the old 
bondholders, 157 even the vultures . I5S 
Experts are drafting new model provisions for sovereign debt 
contracts.  These include : I 59 
156 .  Presumably, the stronger the IMF policy against bailouts, the lower the price. 
157.  See Lerrick & Meltzer, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 3-4 .  
158. Any additional value -creating features of the proposed sovereign bankruptcy regime can 
be included in the new bond contracts. For example, if a standstill declared by the IMF creates 
value, the new bond contracts can channel enforcement through an indenture trustee whose 
enforcement powers yield to the standstill. Taylor, supra note 1 1 .  If subordination to new loans 
made after a default makes the bondholders better off, the pari passu clauses in the bonds can 
open up an exception. See Lerrick & Meltzer, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 3-4.  If creditors need to delegate 
bargaining authority to representatives, that too can be done in advance in the contracts. See 
Taylor, supra note 1 1 ,  � 13 .  
There is  a rich literature advocating contractually authorized bankruptcy. See, e.g. , Alan 
Schwartz, A Contract Theory App roach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J.  1 807, 1820-39 
(1998); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Nlenu Approach to Corporate Banhruptcy, 71 
TEX. L .  REV. 51,  100-2 1 (1 992).  
15 9. See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 90.  See also Miller, supra note 1,  at 183-97,  for an 
overview. See also G - 7 FIN.  MINISTERS & CENT.  BANK GOVERNORS, DECLARATION � �  4-9 (1 998) 
(examining and suggesting reforms to the international financial system) , at 
http ://www .imf.org/external/np/g7/103098dc .htm; G-7 FIN. MINISTERS & C ENT. BANK 
GOVERNORS, STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE MULTILATERAL 
D EVELOPMENT BANKS � �  1 1 - 1 3  (200 1) ,  at http ://www.g8. utoronto.ca/finance/ fmO l0707 .htm; 
GROUP O F  TE� , THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES � �  4-10 ( 1996) (considering 
means to deal with future sovereign liquidity crises), available at http ://www.bis.org/ 
publ/gten03 .htm; INT'L MONETARY & FIN. COMM. ,  BD. OF GOVERNORS, IMF, COMMUNIQUE � 1 1  
(200 1) (looking forward to exploration of increased private sector involvement in crisis 
prevention and management) , at http://www.imf.org/external/ np/cm/200 1l0 10429b.htm; see also, 
e.g. , BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARC HITECTURE: A 
PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA 9- 18 ( 1 999) (offering "pragmatic" proposals for reform) ; BARRY 
EICHEN GREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORD ERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN 
DEBTORS 28-54 (1995) (discussing options and offering an agenda for reform) ; Lee C. Buchheit, A 
Lawyer's Perspective on the New Financial Architecture, 14 J .  INT'L BANIGNG L. 225 (1 999) , 
reprinted in TH E  REFORM O F  THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ARCHITECTURE 235 (Rosa M. Lastra 
ed. , 200 1) ;  Lee C. Buchheit, The Collectiue Representation Clause, INT'L FIN.  L. REV . ,  Sept. 1998, 
at 9 ,  9- 1 1  (considering possible changes to bond docu mentation) ; Lee C .  Buchheit, Majority 
Action Clauses May Help Resolve Debt Crises, INT'L FIN . L. REV . ,  July 19 98, at 13,  13 - 14;  Lee C. 
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( 1) Provisions aggregating all the issuer's bonds into one class 
for purposes of approving a composition. The CACs would permit the 
modification of payment terms by a majority fraction of the bonds that 
is significantly less than the current 100 percent requirement. 
(2) Clauses restricting individual bondholder enforcement 
power. These enforcement constraints could include : 
(i) Majority action enforcement clauses . These require 
permission from a significant fraction of the bondholders before 
an individual bondholder can bring suit. This clause,  taken 
together with a CAC respecting contract amendment, makes 
restructuring easier by relaxing the unanimity requirement 
and makes it harder for maverick creditors, in search of 
preferential payments ,  to bring disruptive litigation. 
(ii) Super Trustee provisions .  Trustees under current 
New Y or k - issued sovereign bond contracts perform largely 
ministerial tasks . 160 Super Trustee provisions would grant the 
trustees significantly more authority . The Super Trustee would 
be able to make substantive decisions for the bondholders on 
matters such as whether to bring suit for unpaid amounts and 
whether to accept a restructuring offer. A Super Trustee would 
act for the benefit of the creditor class as a whole, solving 
collective action problems while eliminating the problem of 
maverick litigation. 
(iii) Sharing clauses.  A sharing clause obliges any 
bondholder who sues to share the recovery ratably with the 
other bondholders. 161 As a practical matter, the sharing clause 
removes the incentive for individual bondholders to sue 
unilaterally in the hope of receiving an earlier and larger 
payment than that received by other members of the group . 
Designing new clauses is easy. The hard part is getting the 
debtors and creditors to accept them. 162 The parties are far apart : 
Buchheit, Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause, INT'L FIN. L. REV. ,  Aug. 1998, at 
17 ,  1 7 - 1 9  (exploring the use of contractual provisions in sovereign bonds). 
160. This is a far cry from the world of common stock, where shareholders of large public 
companies delegate almost all authority for important decisions to the Board of Directors. 
1 6 l .  Under the interpretation of the pari passu clause in Elliott v. Peru, Elliott Assocs . ,  L .P . ,  
General Docket No.  2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of  Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept . 26 ,  2000), this 
is what the pari passu clause would operate to do. That particular interpretation, however, has 
come under some challenge . See supra note 109. 
162 .  Krueger, for the IMF, responds that the UAC-CAC swap will not work. Krueger, supra 
note 78. The same creditor coordination problems that necessitate a mandatory bankruptcy will 
get in the swap's way. Id. Opportunistic bondholders will hold out, with the result that 
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While those on the drafting project talk about a two-thirds or three­
quarters majority rule ,  the Emerging Market Creditors Association 
suggest something between 90 and 95 percent as an appropriate 
majority rule. 163 Many sovereign debtors match the creditors in their 
lack of enthusiasm for the contractual initiative. Presumably, they 
fear that CACs could raise borrowing costs and retard the flow of 
credit. But the market has begun taking baby steps towards CACs 
despite these fears . We have seen offerings in New York using both a 
75 percent and an 85  percent threshold.  Although the 7 5  percent 
threshold appears to be winning, it is still too early to predict where 
the market will settle ,  or whether it will settle on CACs at al1. 164 
A full scale and rapid transition to CAC bonds in new 
financings seems likely only if the IMF credibly conditions the 
availability of credit on use of the new debt contract provisions . 165 But 
even if such a stick proved effective , it would take years before a full 
transition to CACs could take place . At the end of 200 1 ,  $354 billion of 
sovereign debt was outstanding. Of this amount, 70 percent was 
issued in the United States and Germany under UACs, while most of 
the remaining 30 percent was issued in Britain and Luxembourg 
under CACS. 166 If all bonds issued from 2002 onward contain CACs 
but none of the existing UACs are amended, 80 percent of bonds would 
be governed by CACs by 2 0 1 0  and 90 percent by 2019 . 1 67 
A near term contractual solution to the creditor coordination 
problem, however, calls for a more heroic effort: All (or nearly all) 
outstanding UAC bonds would have to be exchanged for CAC bonds . If 
the contractual approach's basic assumption-that CACs create value 
significant numbers of UAC bonds will remain in circulation. ld. Nor, absent a mandate, can 
there be any guarantee that CACs will be universal in  future bond issues .  ld. Finally, absent a 
neutral supervising authority, there will be  no guarantee of a clean vote. ld. 
163 .  See Michael M. Chamberlin, Executive Director EMTA, Sovereign Debt Contracts: What 
Do We Need to Change 3 (2002) (reporting on the view of the six emerging market debt trade 
associations) , http ://www.emta. org/keyper/iifl O I 7 . pdf. 
164 .  See Barham, supra note 93, at 1 3  (asking whether Argentina will choose the 75 percent 
from Mexico and Uruguay or 85 percent from Brazil) ; Felix Salmon, Brazil Goes Off on a CACs 
Tangent, EUROMONEY, June 2003, at 1 56,  1 56. 
165. For a discussion of the difficulties which might arise in connection with this ,  see INT'L 
MON ETARY FUND , COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES IN SOVEREIGN BOND CONTRACTS­
ENCOURAGING GREATER USE 13 ,  15 ,  16-20 (2002) . 
Taylor suggests that the IMF could offer an interest rate reduction for sovereign borrowers 
whose private sector bonds contain CACs.  See Taylor, supra note 1 l . Taylor also mentions a 
stick-the IMF would require any country using a credit facility to use CACs in its bonds. ld. 
The previous administration also took a position against interference with contract rights, even 
as it admitted that the contracts might be costly and inefficient. Tarullo, supra note 9, at 6 7 l .  
166 .  INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 165, at 5 tbLI. 
167. lei. at 6. 
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by solving creditor coordination problems-is correct, then both 
debtors and creditors should be clamoring for these CAC exchanges .  
But there has been no such demand. So it  appears that a carrot will be 
needed in the form of additional consideration. Alternatively, a stick 
could be wielded through the exit consent device, but these devices are 
disliked in the creditor community. 168 Plus, some exchanges will be 
hard to effectuate, even with exit consents, because the issuers are 
already in trouble. 169 If CACs do create value, why this resistance? 
The discussion that follows shows that the CAC value story is 
contestable. In the imperfect world we live in, a rational bondholder 
may prefer the VAC. 
A. Empirical Studies 
A number of empirical studies seek to sustain (or falsify) the 
claim that CACs create value.  If the CAC value story is accurate, CAC 
bonds should sell at lower yields than UAC bonds. But setting up a 
pair of comparison bonds is difficult . Ide ally, one would want thickly 
traded bonds from the same issuer, with identical contract terms 
(other than, of course, the amendment clauses) . 170 No such bonds 
exist; therefore, the studies proceed on a rougher basis.  
One set of studies finds that CACs reduce borrowing costs for 
the most creditworthy issuers, and increase them for less creditworthy 
issuers. The inference is that good credits benefit from the prospect of 
coordination and lower default costs, while bad credits do not benefit 
because the cost advantages of the CAC are outweighed by moral 
hazard and default risk. l71 Other studies find no evidence that CACs 
affect borrowing costS. 172 Here, the inference is that the cost benefits 
of easy restructuring are cancelled out by the attendant decrease In 
the costs of default and aggravation of the moral hazard problem. 
168. ld. at 19.  
169. ld. 
1 70. ld. 
1 7 1 .  Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Is Aggregatio n a Problem for Sovereign De b t  
Restru cturing?, 93 AM. ECO N . REV. 80 (2003) (PAPERS & PROC EEDINGS); see also Barry 
Eichengreen et aI. ,  Crisis Resolution: Next Steps, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 
(forthcoming 2003) (reporting on recent empirical research on the topic) , http://papers .nber.org/ 
papers/w 10095.pdf. 
1 72. See TORBJORN BECKER ET AL . ,  BOND RESTR UCTURING AND MORAL HAZARD:  ARE 
COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES CO STLY? 25-26 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 0 1/92, 
200 1) ;  see also Anthony Richards, The Usage and Pricing of Collective Action Clauses in 
International Bond Issues (May 26, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) . Still 
more studies find that CAC issuers pay a small premium.  Contrariwise, some report a small 
discount for UK issuance. INT'L MON ETARY FUN D,  supra note 165 ,  at 12 .  
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We question whether any study in the present context can yield 
a measure of the relative value of CACs and UACs.  Even if a pair of 
comparison bonds existed and the market perceived an advantage in 
holding the CAC bond, it is not clear that bond prices would reflect the 
market's p erception. Hypothesize an issuer having CAC bonds and 
UAC bonds outstanding simultaneously. If the issuer goes into 
distress ,  a bondholder coordination problem arises respecting the UAC 
bonds. If the UAC bondholders cannot be induced to agree to a 
composition, then any composition tentatively reached with the CAC 
bondholders presumably fails as well. The final effectiveness of the 
CAC issue composition (if properly drafted) would be conditioned on 
the closing of the compositions of all other issues of bonds . Otherwise, 
the CAC issue would end up surrendering value while the UAC issue 
withheld consent, causing a transfer of value from the CAC issue to 
the UAC issue . 
Extending this line of analysis, hypothesize an issuer having 
only CAC bonds outstanding. Would that country's debt have a lower 
coupon than debt of the same maturity of another country of equal 
creditworthiness whose bonds contained UACs? We doubt it . Nothing 
would guarantee that, in the event of distress at some future time , all 
of the first country's issues still would be governed by CACs .  This is 
because nothing prevents a CAC borrower from negotiating a new 
debt issue in New York using UACs,  or, alternatively, from refunding 
an existing CAC borrowing in New York under a UAC .  The low coupon 
CAC borrower, thus, could at any time turn itself into a borrower with 
a potential creditor coordination problem. 1 73 Given this inherent 
flexibility of status, it is difficult to see how a market yield comparison 
could demonstrate the value differential between CACs and UACs. 174 
The result is that the value creation story remains a theoretical 
assertion. If the assertion is correct, however, we must account for the 
market resistance to CACs by reference to frictions, behavioral biases ,  
173.  The problem could b e  solved in the CACs themselves. The CACs would condition the 
availability of majority amendment on majority amendment's availability in all of the issuer's 
bonds. We are unaware of any real world use of such a provision. 
174 .  Compare the study of the effect of projected restructuring costs due to aggregation 
problems-that is, coordination costs stemming from a large number of bond issues outstanding, 
each one of which separately would have to assent in a restructuring. By hypothesis, t.he larger 
the number of bond issues outstanding, the greater the potential cost. Barry Eichengreen and 
Ashoka Mody show that distributing the same principal amount of debt across diflerent bond 
issues raises the cost of debt on the tenth issue by about 8 basis points. Eichengreen & Mody, 
supra note 1 7 1 .  The impact is greater when the issuer has a low credit rating. Interestingly, they 
find that the presence or absence of CACs does not significantly effect the perceived costs of 
aggregation. Id. 
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path dependencies, and other imperfections.  Alternatively, we can 
question the value assertion itself. Perhaps CACs do not hold out a 
first best equilibrium solution for sovereign debt contracting. If CACs 
are not first best, then a rational creditor in a second best world might 
choose a UAC . 
B. Frictions and Imperfections 
1 .  Ignorance and Myopia 
The first wave of articles and reports on CACs,  produced in the 
mid and late 1 990s,  had an explanatory tone. The writers assumed 
that sovereign debtors and creditors needed to learn about the clauses' 
benefits .  Once the market heard the word, it would pick up the value 
on the table. 175 Yet, after a plethora of articles ,  numerous conferences, 
and repeated official sector pronouncements, most new bond issues 
done prior to 2003 still contained UACs.  Given the bombardment of 
material since the mid- 1 990s,  no one can argue that the reason this 
move did not begin prior to 2003 was that no one knew about the 
CACs .  
Continued attachment to UACs suggests myopia on the parties' 
part , particularly amongst creditors . If creditors have a strong, albeit 
irrational , preference for UACs ,  borrowers will cater to this preference 
in order to avoid an increase in borrowing costs . This leaves open the 
problem of explaining the creditors' irrational preference. 
2 .  Drafting Inertia 
Some research suggests that contracting parties are biased in 
favor of using established, standard terms in their contracts.  This is 
referred to as the "status quo" bias . 176 Perhaps we have such a 
pattern of bias here, especially considering that the respective drafting 
175.  For example, take the articles by Lee Buchheit. See supra note 159 .  One sees a similar 
tone in the early official sector reports exhorting the use of CACs, such as the 1996 Rey Report 
that recommended the adoption of CACs as a measure to facilitate debt restructuring.  GROUP OF 
TEN, supra note 159. For a chronology of events, see Press Release, Dep't of Fin . ,  Canada, 
Reforming the Global Financial Architecture: A Chronology, available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/ 
news02/02-034e.html#Reforming. 
1 76. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Ru les, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998) (arguing that parties to a contract view default terms as the status 
quo and that parties prefer the status quo to other alternatives) . 
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practices of New York and London can be traced back to Victorian 
times . l 77 
A status quo bias is not an immovable block, however. It is only 
a bias .  Even as people attach themselves to the contract terms that 
they begin with or inherit, they still should be willing to switch in 
order to capture significant benefits .  The benefits claimed for CACs 
seem significant enough to have induced a switch by now, if those 
benefits actually exist. 
3 .  Moral Hazard 
Under the moral hazard story, creditors and defaulting 
sovereigns both want bailouts. l78 If their contracts have CACs,  the 
official sector-the rich countries and the international financial 
institutions they control-will order the debtors to work out any 
problems with their creditors . UACs,  in contrast, let the distressed 
debtors and creditors point to an insurmountable barrier to 
restructuring. The official sector then has no option but to provide a 
subsidy. The preference for UACs thus follows from opportunism. 
But this story is incomplete . First, it only accounts for the 
preference for UACs beginning in the mid- 1 990s.  It does not explain 
why UACs proliferated in the first place or why lenders in the private 
sector often prefer them. 179 Second, not every distressed sovereign 
gets bailed out, as the world saw with Argentina. It follows that a 
bond issued by a country with a low likelihood of getting a bailout 
could be more valuable with a CAC. But we see no such pattern. 
Third, bailouts are not free .  They come with conditions that further 
the political interests of the IMF and its primary sponsors . 1 80 There 
177 .  De Forest Billyou, Corporate Mortgage Bonds and Majority Clauses, 57 YALE L.J. 595,  
595-96 (1948). The "innovation externalities" identified by Kahan ,  supra note 66,  at 1079,  in 
respect of the improvement of corporate trust indentures, do not obtain in respect of CACs and 
UACs. An innovation externality deters contractual improvement because, absent patent 
protection, the improvement is shared among the entire class of users. The sharing denudes the 
innovating lawyers of an incentive to invest in improvements. Id. Here, in contrast, the 
competing contract forms already are on the table. For the same reason, we see no network 
externality deterrent here. Standard forms are available if the market wants to shift to CACs. 
178. See supra text accompanying note 14 .  
179. See infra note 184.  
180.  For example, it  is  rumored that recent disbursements of funds to Pakistan and Turkey 
were impliedly conditioned on supporting the anti-terrorism coalition and clamping down on 
Islamic militants within their borders. Brazil provides a more explicit recent case . At the time of 
its bailout, a pending election both contributed to the distress and gave rise to policy concerns in 
the official sector. Leftist candidates who were leading in the polls were required to make public 
guarantees that they would continue to support the current government's free market economic 
policies-a step at least partially inconsistent with their political platforms. Further, it is 
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may be some countries that are simply too big or too nuclear to be 
allowed to fail .  For the rest, it is not clear that strategic contracting 
makes sense . 
4. Signaling 
Asymmetric information can explain the failure to adopt CACs.  
The story is that creditors do not have full information about debtors, 
and thus worry about unobservable downside factors . When a debtor 
asks for a CAC, the creditor infers that the debtor expects to default. 
No debtor wants to signal itself as being at a high risk of defaulting; 
therefore, no debtor asks for CACs .  
O f  course, if CACs create value in excess of the cost to the 
debtor of the negative signal, then we should expect the debtors to 
introduce them despite the signal . A first mover problem may explain 
why this does not happen. Given inertia in the market, the first 
issuers to change their contracts disrupt market expectations and, as 
a result, incur special costs . Those costs would be compounded in the 
case of a change from VACs to CACs because the benefits stemming 
from the clauses accrue on a very long term. 1S1  It follows that the 
costs may outweigh the benefits for the first mover, even though the 
benefits far outweigh the costs for debtors as a whole . 
There are three problems, however, with this explanation. 
First, it looks only at the debtor's stake in the contract's amendment 
terms. Thus, even if the explanation is correct, we still have to explain 
why the creditors do not request CACs.  Second, the story fails to 
confront historic market practice . An issuer seeking a CAC always has 
the option of taking its loan transaction to London. In so doing it runs 
little chance of sending a negative signal respecting creditworthiness,  
as New York does not take the good credits and London the bad. 
Countries finance in London for a long list of reasons, like interest 
rates,  transaction costs, customers , and relationships with 
intermediaries ;  all factors more important at closing than the choice of 
a CAC over a VAC. Third, recent market developments rebut the 
story. The first moves have taken place (we suspect with pressure 
difficult for many countries to know, ex ante, whether they will qualify for a bailout in the event 
of a future economic crisis. A couple of years ago, Pakistan was grouped with Ecuador and 
Ukraine as a country unlikely to receive a bailout. The geopolitical shifts of 200 1 brought it to 
the front of the queue . 
1 8 1 .  INT'L MONETARY FUND , supra note 1 65, at 1 1 .  For a fuller discussion of frictions that 
inhibit the improvement of standard form contracts, see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, 
Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behauior and Cognitiue 
Biases, 74 WASH. U. L .Q.  347, 353-65 (1 996) . 
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from the Treasury) , but to  our knowledge there have been no 
subsequent exchange offers to move from UACs to CACs. 
5 .  Path Dependence 
The practice divergence between New York and London can be 
explained in part by legislative intervention and legal precedent. In 
the United States, Section 3 1 6(a) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1 93 9  
requires that contracts governing publicly issued bonds contain 
UACS. 182 Contrariwise,  it has been suggested that the United 
Kingdom requires inclusion of CACs in bonds under its law . 183 
Neither regulation extends to sovereign bonds, but such regulations 
could have "locked in" the drafting practice in the two financial 
centers. Departure from the forms disrupts expectations and causes  
costs to be incurred. Other things being equal, could not the 
intermediaries be sticking mindlessly to the inherited forms, which 
have been influenced by regulation? 
The problem is that other things are not equal under the CAC 
superiority story. Given value on the table, New York underwriters 
would request redrafting of the standard forms, and the lawyers 
would do what they were told despite their practice traditions and any 
associated cognitive biases. 184 
1 82 .  Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 3 1 6(a), 1 5  U.S .C .  § 77ppp (2000) . The purpose of the 
section was to discourage out-of-court compositions so as to force the parties into the then new 
Chapter X bankruptcy procedure , where strong judicial supervision was provided for. Roe, supra 
note 6, at 234 .  Roe argues, correctly, that subsequent changes in bankruptcy law and practice 
remove the need for the mandate. Id. at 3 1 6 . Our point is that removal of the mandate would 
bring no change in the actual provisions of bonds, which would continue to include UACs.  
1 83 .  INT'L MONETARY FUND, REPORT OF THE ACTING MANAGING DIRECTOR TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON PROGRESS IN REFORMING THE IMF 
AND STRENGTHENING THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM � 54 (Apr.  
12 ,  2000), http://www.imf.org/external/np/omdJ2000/report.htm. cited in Tarullo. supra note 9. at 
671  n. 196 .  
1 84.  Plus, the continuing presence in United States law of a UAC mandate respecting 
publicly traded bonds does not dictate a UAC practice respecting many bonds and notes issued 
outside of the mandate's parameters. These include privately placed notes, notes traded on the 
so-called 144A market, b ank term loans, and sovereign bonds. Yet, despite the absence of 
regulations mandating the terms of any of these debt contracts, almost all use UACs in the 
United States. Howard J. Kashner, Majority Clauses and Non-banhruptcy Corporate 
Reorganizations-Contractual and Statutory Alternatives, 44 Bus. LAW. 123,  12 4-25 (1 988) . The 
UAC practice, by the way, also shows up with respect to bank term loans in the United 
Kingdom-that country's dominant mode of debt finance. JOHN ARMOUR & SIMON DEAKIN, 
NORMS IN PRIVATE INSOLVENCY: THE "LONDON ApPROACH" TO THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS (Univ. of Pa. L.  Sch . ,  Inst. of L. & Econ . ,  Working Paper No. 1 73, 200 1 ) .  
CAC bonds appeared i n  American financial history i n  cognizable numbers i n  only one era. 
This was during the Depression, when new b onds issued in reorganizations of insolvent single 
purpose real estate corporations sometimes contained CACs. According to testimony by an SEC 
54 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol . 5 7 : 1  
6 .  Summary 
The foregoing explanations, taken separately or as a group , fail 
to explain why CACs have failed to proliferate (assuming that the 
value story has merit) . But they do suggest that frictions will retard 
the present contractual reform initiative .  They also leave us with a 
question:  Whether lenders for more than a century have been 
investing billions of dollars pursuant to manifestly irrational 
contracts? 
C. The Persistent Preference for Unanimous Action 
vVhy, despite the logic of maj ority action, do American lenders 
retain their preference for unanimity not only in sovereign bonds but 
in all types of lending? We have three suggestions . The first follows 
from enforcement theory: UACs deter default by making it more 
expensive. Our second suggestion follows from reputational theory: 
vVhen a rehabilitating debtor makes a composition offer, the process 
context influences the division of the surplus ;  UACs force the debtor to 
make a higher offer. The third suggestion looks to intercreditor 
conflicts . Coalitions within the creditor group or amongst creditors 
and the debtor can use the majority action privilege to impose unequal 
outcomes. The rational creditor will require a defense against such 
exploitation.  Absent a robust backstop of intercreditor good faith 
duties, only a right of individual dissent suffices .  
1 .  The Cost of Default 
The value of a CAC lies in cheaper creditor coordination and 
enhanced chances of composition. But there are costs .  Whether by 
reducing out of pocket costs or by making compositions more 
accessible ,  CACs make default cheaper. To. the extent default is 
cheaper, strategic default becomes a more viable alterative.  
staffer at the Hearings on  the Trust Indenture Act, CAC bonds constituted about 10 percent of 
the market. Hearings on H.R. 5220, 76th Congo 284-85 ( 1939) . Much like dealmakers at today's 
IMF, the dealmakers in those reorganizations operated in a world without a bankruptcy 
procedure that imposed majority rule (at least prior to 1 934) .  Also, like actors at the IMF, they 
had become exasperated with coordination problems stemming from UACs.  Bi llyou , supra note 
1 7 7 ,  at 595-96. Unfortunately for the CAC value story, however, those actors also were fa mously 
sleazy. The real estate bond firms, precursors of the junk bonds dealers of the 1970s and 1980s, 
had been hawking speculative paper to credulous retail investors for decades, promising high 
returns for no risk . See JAlvIES GRANT, M ONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LEN DING IN 
AMERICA fROM THE CIVIL WAR TO M ICHAEL MILKEN 157-72  ( 1 992) (providing a histOl'Y of early 
twentieth century real estate finance). 
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But do  sovereign lenders really incur a cognizable risk of 
strategic default? A default makes sense for a sovereign if the savings 
from the composition exceed the costs of default. If we assume a debt 
structure with CACs,  that result follows only if the debtor persuades a 
majority of creditors to vote for the restructuring. We think it likely 
that institutional lenders will vote against such a restructuring if they 
think that the country is acting opportunistically. If we project 
correctly, the advantage of UACs over CACs with respect to strategic 
default deterrence is negligible. UACs would have a more cognizable 
advantage if information asymmetries can prevent big lenders from 
distinguishing between a strategic and a distress default . But, if there 
were a real risk of that happening, one would have expected creditors 
to be more enthusiastic about the IMF bankruptcy proposal. The IMF 
makes itself the gatekeeper in the proposal, undertaking to analyze a 
country's true financial condition before commencement of a 
composition process. Now, even though the creditors had many 
reasons for opposing the IMF's proposal, with lack of trust in the IMF 
no doubt prime among them,  we suspect that they saw no 
countervailing benefit in IMF gatekeeping. Our guess is that the 
creditors believe themselves and other market actors, such as credit 
rating agencies and investment banks, to be quite capable of 
distinguishing between strategic and distress  defaults. 
A complication remains. We also have seen that sovereign 
defaults have strategic overtones even in distress situations : 
Sometimes government actors decide to default, making a political 
decision that weighs the impact of tax hikes and other strains on the 
domestic economy against the cost of default . 185 If CACs influence 
these calculations so as to make default m ore likely, then it follows 
that the contractual initiative does not hold out a free lunch, at least 
to a private creditor . 
Nobody knows where these costs and benefits net out . Recall 
the ambiguous implications of the empirical  studies canvassed in the 
previous section. One study, finding no evidence that CACs lower 
borrowing costs , lSG reasonably inferred that the decrease in the cost of 
default and the attendant increase in the magnitude of the moral 
hazard problem caused by CACs could offset the benefits of easy 
restructuring. On this analysis, a creditor rationally could choose 
between a CAC and a UAC based on a coin flip . From this , an 
explanation for the century-long divergence in the drafting traditions 
185 .  See supra text accompanying note 5 l .  
186. See sup rct note 1 72 and accompanying text. 
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of New York and London follows . As between the two apparently e qual 
choices,  any small factor in the legal, economic, or cultural background 
can cause the practice to tip in favor of one approach over the other . 
The choice having been made, the conservative ,  repetitive dynamic of 
debt contracting assures that the choice becomes universal in the 
market and prevails for an indefinite period.  
Recall that a contrasting study suggested that creditworthy 
borrowers might prefer CACs because cheaper creditor coordination 
would lower the creditors' default costs . Borrowers with bad credit 
would use UACs because,  with default a more immediate prospect, the 
cost advantages of the CAC would be outweighed in the lenders' minds 
by moral hazard and default risk . 187 But this theory can support the 
opposite conclusion as well. 188 Bolton and Scharfstein hypothesize 
that a low-quality firm would find it optimal to maximize its 
liquidation value : A distress default being likely, it would want 
contracts carrying as little cost as possible in the event of default. The 
smaller the number of creditors and the lower the voting barrier, the 
cheaper the liquidation and the greater the value of the debt. 189 In 
contrast, with high credit borrowers, strategic default is the dominant 
problem. Factors increasing the cost of such a default-such as 
multiple creditors and tougher voting rules-enhance the value of the 
debt. 190 
We emerge with opposing sugge stions :  CACs for good credits 
and UACs for bad credits,  or alternatively, UACs for good credits and 
CACs for bad credits . This ambiguous economics fails to predict a 
logical dominance by either UACs or CACS . 19 1  
2 .  The Division of the Surplus 
Bolton and Scharfstein explain that the greater the number of 
creditors and the higher the percentage of creditor votes needed to 
approve a renegotiation, the lower the debtor firm's surplus in the 
renegotiation . 192 This point says something important about United 
States creditors' preference for UACs. 
187.  See supra note 171  and accompanying text. 
1 88.  Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt  Structure and the Number of 
Creditors, 104 J.  POL. ECON.  1 ,  1 9-20 (1996) . 
189 .  Id. at 3 .  
190. Id. 
1 9 l .  Patrick Bolton notes an additional complicating factor. Bolton, supra note 76 .  A 
borrower's commitment to excessively high restructuring costs does more than build in a 
disincentive to default. Id . at 3 l .  It also builds in an incentive to overborrow. Id. at 3 1 -32.  
192 .  Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 1 88, at 18 .  
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Consider the game posited below: 
Exchange Offer Game 
Creditor B 
Cooperate Defect 
Creditor A Cooperate 625, 6 2 5  550, 800 
Defect 800, 550 400, 400 
The set up assumes that a sovereign borrower in 
distress has offered its two creditors a composition of $550.  
T h e  offer is  stingy: I f  the creditors surmount their collective 
action problem and negotiate w ith the borrower, they can get 
the offer increased to $625. Holding out, "defecting" in the 
parlance of the prisoner's dilemma, can mean an $800 payoff. 
If both creditors hold out, the deal fails and the recovery i s  
$400 received after a n  extended default and a long lapse of 
time. 
It is unclear what a creditor should do. The italicized outcomes 
in the chart show A's optimal moves given the alternatives of 
cooperation and defection by B. If B accepts the offer, A is better off 
holding out and taking the $800.  But if B holds out, A is better off 
cooperating and taking the $550, thereby avoiding the worst-case 
payoff of $400. Since A does not know what B is going to do, it is not 
clear how A should play. A multiple equilibrium outcome results-the 
situation is unstable. 
The posited payoffs lend insight into the divergence of views 
between the official sector and the creditors. Bankruptcy proponents 
focus on the avoidance of the $400 pc.yoff and the realization of the 
$625 payoff, arguing that only a bankruptcy process offers the 
creditors a stable context in which to realize the $625 .  The 
contractarians also focus on the avoidance of the $400, positing that 
with CACs and a large group of creditors , the prospect of an $800 
recovery is eliminated, and with it the $400 worst-case scenario . The 
question is how the dispersed creditors then surmount the negotiating 
barrier presented by the take-it-or-leave-it exchange offer of $550, so 
as to benefit from a more equal division of the surplus .  The magnitude 
of the resulting problem depends on the barrier's height . Given 
institutional bond holding, the barrier may not present a substantial 
problem in the real world. Informal coordination is possible amongst a 
small group of lead institutions , making it possible for the group to 
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reject $550 and bargain for $625 as a group without the need for a 
bankruptcy process.  
The UAC proponent sees things differently. If all the bonds 
have CACs ,  the take-it-or-leave-it offer is $550.  The question is  
whether the offer would be higher if all the bonds had UACs .  We 
answer the question in the affirmative, and suspect that most 
creditors do too. Given information asymmetries ,  the creditors will 
have a range of upset prices respecting acceptance of the debtor's offer. 
If the debtor needs 100 percent or a supermaj ority, it will have to 
increase its offer to meet the reservation prices at the higher end of 
the range . 193 The UAC thus counteracts the disorganized creditors' 
tendency to cut and run to take a lowball offer. 
Of course the UAC creates a hold out problem even as it causes 
the offer to rise .  But a hard-nosed bondholder has a response :  If the 
offer makes a generous split of the surplus, holdouts will not be so 
numerous as to threaten the deal. No one ever expects 1 00 percent 
participation in a composition under UACs.  Yet such exchange offers 
close all the time on the basis of supermajority acceptance. 194 
Meanwhile ,  neither the bankruptcy advocates nor the contractarians 
offer evidence that holdouts regularly cause exchange offers to fail . 195 
When offers do fail, it may be that they are too low and, as a result, 
attract something much less than a supermajority of creditors . 196 
1 93 .  This is nothing more than the law of downward sloping demand. It explains why 
bidders make tender offers for majority blocks with back end mergers, rather than attempt to 
purchase firms through open market purchases. See generally Richard Booth, Discounts and 
Other lVlysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1 055 ( 1 99 1 )  (arguing that the existence of 
downward sloping demand explains various market phenomena) ; Lynn Stout, Are Taheover 
Premiums Really Premiums? Marhet Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J .  1 235,  
1259-75 ( 1990) . 
194. The creditor associations are asserting that a 90 percent participation would be 
needed-a daunting figure. See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 90. But a look at the leading private 
case, Katz v. Oah Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1 986), shows a complex exchange offer 
with an upset participation requirement of 85 percent or less. That upset calculation will change 
from situation to situation. 
195. See Stewart Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence fro m  
Financially Distressed Firms, 5 2  J .  FIN. 1 6 1 ,  169-70 ( 1 997) (showing that the holdout problem 
does not seem to be so severe as to prevent the accomplishment of restructurings respecting 
public debt, particularly given use of coercive devices like exit consents); see also Jean Helwege, 
How Long Do Junh Bonds Spend in Default?,  54 J.  FIN. 341 ,  348-49 (1999) . 
196. We draw indirect support for this assertion from Marcel Kahan and Bruce Tuckman, Do 
Bondholders Lose from Junh Bond Covenant Changes ? 66 J. Bus. 499 ( 1 993) . This presents the 
results of a study of 58 consent solicitations in which an issuer of widely held debt requested the 
modification of existing covenants but did not request either interest deferral or principal 
forgiveness. Id. at 502-03. Since covenants tend to be absent from investment grade debt, nearly 
all of the issues surveyed were junk bonds. Id. at 503. The solicitations broke down as follows: 25 
were simple consent solicitations in which receipt of an offered cash payment was conditioned on 
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A numerical example will help explain this .  Assume that a 
sovereign is in default on debt with a face amount of $ 1 00.  These 
bonds are trading for $65,  a value that can be expected to fall further 
unless rehabilitation succeeds by means of a composition. The 
sovereign, now on the road to recovery, can afford to pay $95.  The 
surplus is $95 minus $65 or $30. Assume that with a CAC providing 
for amendment by a two-thirds majority, the sovereign can get the 
requisite participation by offering a bond worth $75-a two-thirds to 
one-third split of the surplus in the sovereign's favor. With a VAC, it 
will have to offer more . Assume that if it offers a bond worth $85,  it 
will get 90 percent participation under the VAC, leaving holdouts with 
face value claims of $ 10.  The value of the $85 exchange offer IS as 
follows: 
$85 x . 90 = $ 76 . 50 (consideration to participants) 
$ 100 x . 10 = $1 0. 00 (consideration to holdouts) 
$ 86.50 (total yield to bondholders) 
This recovery reverses the percentage division of the surplus­
now it is roughly two-thirds to the bondholders and one-third to the 
sovereign. The problem lies in the possibility that too many 
bondholders will hold out and defeat the offer, leaving the holders 
with bonds only worth $65.  Let us assume that composition failures 
due to holdouts are rare-a 20 percent possibility. The question is 
consent to the amendment; 24 were accompanied by tender offers; 8 were accompanied by 
exchange offers; 1 was accompanied by a tender offer and an exchange offer. Id. A requirement of 
an exit consent or consent as a condition to payment was present in 44 of the 48 offers for which 
data could be found. Id. at 506-07. The issuers sought, inter a lia,  to make leveraged acquisitions 
(31 percent), make dividends or other stockholder payments ( 13 .8  percent) , conduct 
recapitalizations ( 10 .3  percent), sell assets (8.6 percent), and issue more debt (6.9 percent) . Id. at 
504 tbl. l .  
The average payment offered i n  those solicitations exchanging the consent for cash was 
$20 . 5 1  per $1 ,000 face value; the median cash payment was $ 1 5  per $ 1 ,000 face value; nine of 
the 23 cash offers were above $20; the two largest were $60 and $95. Id. at 5 1 1 .  Evidence of the 
result of the solicitation was found for 52 of the cases, and in 83 percent of these the solicitation 
succeeded. Id. at 503. A statistical survey of the prices of the issues showed that 29 of 42 issues, 
or 69 percent had positive abnormal returns around the time of the announcement of the 
transaction: The average abnormal bond return was 2 .34 percent, while the average abnormal 
return for the stock of the issuer was 9.5 percent. Id. at 51 0. Thus, the study showed that the 
solicitations increased the value of both the debt and the stock. 
Kahan and Tuckman conclude that the issuers have not been exploiting the structural 
opportunity to coerce that the bond contracts create. Id. at 5 1 3 .  They hypothesize that the 
bondholders can, in practice, coordinate their response so as to insure an adequate level of 
payment. Id. As evidence, they cite the formation of bondholder groups in 12 cases; of these 12 
solicitations, 1 1  either failed or had their terms modified before approval . Id. at 5 1 2 .  Overall, in 
42 percent of the cases, the issuers modified the terms after an initial failure to obtain consents. 
Id. 
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whether that possibility makes the CAC offer more attractive .  It does 
not: 
86 .50 x .80 = 69.20 
65.00 x .20 = 1 3. 00 
$ 82 .20 > $75 
Now say the probabilities are 50-50 :  
86 .50 x . 50 = 43 .25  
65 .00  x . 50 = 32. 50 
$ 75 .75  > $75 
The expected value of the UAC exchange offer is still greater 
than that of the CAC offer. Only at under a 50-50 chance of success 
does the CAC create value for the creditors as a whole .  
The above numbers are our invention, posed for the sake of 
argument. To the extent they strike the reader as plausible, it follows 
that UACs are not irrational, and CAC value is not a sure thing. 
3. Exploiting Minority Creditors 
Finally, CACs present a risk of opportunistic collusion between 
the debtor and a maj ority of creditors to exploit a minority of the 
creditors. The debtor makes a side payment to a majority of the 
creditors, inducing them to support a composition that reduces its 
overall debt burden by extracting value from the minority creditors . 
For example, the large creditors may be promised future business with 
the sovereign. This is not an unlikely eventuality in the sovereign 
context, where the sovereign's incentive to compromise arises largely 
from a desire to return to the credit markets. Thus, respecting a 
particular composition on offer, the interests of primary lenders and 
bondholders from the secondary market can diverge, with the 
primaries lumping returns from the composition together with returns 
from projected new deals with the sovereign, and the secondaries 
looking only to the composition . Alternatively, a sufficient fraction of 
the debt may be purchased at low prices by entities sympathetic to the 
sovereign. These sympathizers then validate a composition that 
exploits the minority creditors. 1 97 
With a UAC, a minority creditor does not have to worry about 
majority opportunism. If it thinks the deal burdens its interest 
unduly, it can hold out. 
1 97.  See, e.g. , Coffee & Klein, supra note 68. 
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D. Summary 
The foregoing makes us dubious of the CAC value story. But we 
do not claim to have refuted it . After all, CAC bonds have been issued 
for more than a century in London without friction or objection. But 
we do claim to have refuted the charge that bondholder objections to 
CAC exchanges (and sovereign bankruptcy) stem only from 
opportunism related to IMF bailouts.  This leads us to predict that 
there will be no spontaneous move for universal CACs. If the 
contractual strategy is to accomplish anything, the IMF, the United 
States Treasury, and the other G-7 nations will have to do more than 
simply induce an initial move.  The question they need to ask is: What 
steps will make the move pervasive and stable? 
V. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND GOOD FAITH 
Movement to CACs began in 2003,  evidenced by several New 
York bond issues and successful exchange offers . 198 Where then do we 
find ourselves? To the extent the CAC-UAC preference differential is 
narrow and historically grounded, these recent transactions could 
herald a preference shift. But, to the extent the preference differential 
is based on considerations from the core of the debtor-creditor 
incentive structure, the transactions could amount to only an isolated 
episode . One could then see movement back toward UACs in new bond 
issues (and in any exchange offers, as a sweetener) . 
Either way, the new equilibrium sought by CAC proponents 
could be destabilized if collusive behavior skews the results of 
restructurings for the benefit of majority creditor coalitions. This could 
happen when a majority of bondholders approves a restructuring that 
allocates most of the surplus to the sovereign in exchange for the 
sovereign's promise of future lending business. Alternatively, a one­
sided deal could result when a large percentage of the debt is held by 
nationals of the sovereign (or other sympathetic entities) . If such 
incidents occurred, it would not take long for the markets to move 
back to UACs,  which provide an effective, if crude, mode of prevention. 
It follows that a stable contractual transition to CACs presupposes the 
control of side deals. This control could come from contract drafting or, 
alternatively, from the backstop regime of contract law (specifically, 
the good faith duty) . 
1 98 .  See Elmar B. Koch, Collective Action Clauses-The Way Forward, GEO. J. INT'L L. 
(forthcoming 2004) . 
62 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol .  57 : 1 
In this Part we argue that judges interpreting and applying 
CAC bond contracts under New York law should take the initiative 
and sculpt a regime of intercreditor good faith duties adequate to 
police collusion and other opportunism on the part of bondholders of 
distressed sovereigns . 
A. Contract Drafting Versus Judicial Intervention 
We confront at the outset the argument that sovereigns and 
bondholders desiring to prohibit collusion will draft appropriate 
exclusions in their contracts' voting provisions .  Under this view of 
contract law, the good faith duty operates as a gap filler that prevents 
opportunism that the parties would have contracted to prohibit had 
they thought of the contingency at the outset. Where, however, the 
contingency was well-known to the parties ex ante, and they made no 
provision preventing it, no constraint on self-interested conduct is 
imposed ex post. Since the parties know about the possibility, their 
silence implies consent . Even if consent cannot be implied on the facts 
of the case, the judge should still refrain from intervention in order to 
force parties to draft better contracts . 199 
In the case of CAC bond contracts, the opportunistic action at 
issue-the debtor colluding with a majority of creditors to exploit the 
minority-would likely be envisioned at the outset by the parties .  As 
we have seen, fear of such opportunistic behavior is a primary 
explanation for the century-long use of UACs.  It arguably follows that 
if market actors omit a direct prohibition of collusion in connection 
with a considered move to CACs,  they must not want one. 
Alternatively, since the presence or absence of a prohibition could bear 
on the contract price, the creditors must be unwilling to pay the price 
of the extra protective term. Finally, the creditors may be relying on 
reputational markets . Where markets impose reputational costs on 
misbehaving debtors-for example, by rmsing their costs of 
borrowing-and the court system is both expensive and error prone, 
creditors may rationally decide not to purchase the right to go to court. 
We question this line of reasoning from start to finish, reciting 
our objections from finish to start . 
The reference to reputational enforcement posits that creditors 
prefer reputational sanctions over court-based enforcement. Borrowers 
who misbehave towards their creditors do suffer reputationally . But, 
199.  See, e.g, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 3 6  
J . L .  & ECON. 425, 426, 445 (1 993); Jason Scott Johnston, Op ting In and Opting Out: Bargaining 
for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH.  U. L . Q .  2 9 1 ,  324-25,  329-30 ( 1 992) . 
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as we have seen, the sovereign debt market specializes in long-term 
forgiveness . 2oo More importantly, even if market reputational 
sanctions were significant and there were correspondingly high costs 
of litigation, it does not follow that creditors would avoid putting a 
protective term in the contract, if indeed a suitably drafted term were 
available. Sovereign creditors already contract for numerous 
enforcement provisions, despite the fact that direct enforcement 
opportunities rarely occur. Avoiding the costs of going to court does 
not seem to be a concern that determines the terms of sovereign debt 
contracts . 
Moving to the implication of consent from knowledge , drawing 
inferences from contract silence about what the parties wanted at the 
drafting table is a risky business .  The parties could make either of two 
provisions respecting good faith: They could specify that the contract 
is governed by a good faith duty, or, if the parties wanted no backstop 
protection, they could explicitly exclude good faith review.  As a 
predictive matter, each alternative seems equally likely. Yet neither 
shows up in bond contracts, even though the current default position 
of the law is somewhat unclear in the sovereign context. It follows that 
the problem here cannot be solved as a matter of volition. What we 
have is instead a normative problem: The burden to draft explicitly 
must be allocated to one party or the other and this allocation stems 
from a normative choice on the part of the judge. 
Finally, we reach the argument that refraining from 
intervention forces  the parties to draft explicitly. This presupposes 
that a complete menu of contingent contract terms is available to the 
parties. The sovereign context, however, is full of unforeseeable 
contingencies, a matter made worse by problems of observability and 
verifiability . 201 Much of good faith and fiduciary law exists to provide 
ex post solutions respecting such non-contractable subj ect matter. 
We suspect that this is also the case where the experts do not 
know how to draft explicit prohibitions.202 Even though opportunistic 
200. See su.pra text accompanying notes 36-39.  
2 0 1 .  For contributions to the literature making this point, see Sanford Grossman & Oliver 
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:  A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J .  
POL . ECON. 691 (1 986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 
ECONOMETRICA 755 (1 988) . See also Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom,  Multitasl� Principal­
Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L.  ECON. & ORG . 24 
( 1 991 )  (showing that contracts that tie an agent's compensation to verifiable measures can divert 
effort and attention from other more important but less easily measured aspects of performance) . 
202. That the creditor community is concerned about problems of opportunities arising as a 
result of CACs is evidenced by the recent attempts to draft a "code of conduct." See Angela 
Pruitt, Conduct Code in Emerging Marl�ets Bridges Difference, Dow JONES CAP. MARKETS REP . ,  
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collusion betwe�n the debtor and a majority of its creditors is a known 
possibility with CACs ,  it can show up in infinite guises . 203 For 
example,  the contract could provide that any bondholder with a 
commitment to lend to the bond issuer loses its vote.  But a lender in 
discussions with the sovereign about a future deal would not be picked 
up by such a provision. Indeed, such conversations arguably should 
not come at the cost of the vote and are hard to observe in the bargain. 
Yet ex post, the conversation could occasion conduct viewed as bad 
faith. Specificity with respect to prohibited relationships, such as bond 
holding by entities controlled by the sovereign (who might later 
collude with the sovereign against external lenders) , also creates a 
risk of overcoverage. What one era views as a suspect relationship can 
be deemed harmless by the next generation.204 Things like insider 
borrowing-for example, a sovereign selling bonds to state run 
entities-can be beneficial to the external creditors in cases where the 
insiders are the only ones willing to lend. 
In sum, determining whether there has been opportunism that 
traverses the line of good faith involves a fact intensive, "you know it 
when you see it" analysis .  The job of policing therefore requires an 
adjudicator. 
B. Good Faith, Financial Contracts, and Sovereign Deb t  under CACs 
But will the courts take responsibility and police sovereign debt 
restructurings? Presumably, the proj ected CAC bonds still will be 
governed by the law of New York. But there is precious little New 
York law either on intercreditor duties specifically or sovereign bond 
law more generally. It is likely, then, that a court confronted with the 
good faith case posited here would look at general corporate bond law 
and attempt to translate it to the sovereign context. Unfortunately, 
good faith duties have been found to be essentially nonexistent in the 
corporate bond context . 
. 
We argue that a successful contractual transition to CACs 
would justify a move backwards in time from today's barren good faith 
June 18,  2003. Perhaps more importantly, the one full scale move from UACs to CACs ,  that of 
Uruguay, has provisions in it that take a first step at protecting against debtor opportunism. See 
Felix Salmon, Uruguay Closes a Loophole, EUROMONEY, May 2003, at 1 0 1 ,  10l .  
203. See Jennifer Arlen, Designing Mechanisms to  Govern TaJ�eover Defenses: Private 
Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 1 7, 926·28 
(2002) . 
204. This happened with the Trust Indenture Act, which as originally drafted offered a long 
list of prohibited trustee relationships, all of which were deleted by the Congress in an 
amendment thirty years later. S. REP. NO. 101 - 1 55 (1989) .  
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landscape to precedent from the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, when courts demonstrated more of a willingness to step in 
and block opportunistic behavior by creditors against each other.205 
We propose a trade. For years, the official sector has been pleading for 
CACs .  Under pressure, the markets have reluctantly taken initial 
steps towards them .206 We argue that there is a necessary "give back" 
to support further forward movement and import long term stability : 
Judicial policing of the opportunistic use of CACs in restructurings. 
The trade implies costs for the domestic public sector, in the form of 
additional work for certain courts .  But that extra cost seems minimal 
in comparison to the benefits gained from process improvements in 
sovereign restructurings . 207 
1 .  The Negation of Good Faith 
Recent generations of cases on bondholder rights teach that 
lending relationships are arm's- length transactions among 
sophisticated parties and that, absent an explicit contract term, there 
are no constraints on borrower or intercreditor opportunism.208 The 
courts start with the premise that sophisticated parties enter into 
bond contracts ;  parties capable of negotiating for the terms they 
want. 209 For a court to imply additional terms, ex post, would be to 
frustrate their intent and add uncertainty. 
205. See infra notes 234·240 and accompanying text. 
206. In 1998 there was a bond issue by Thailand that was done with CACs,  but this may 
have been an aberration. See ELECTRICITY G ENERATING AUTHORITY OF THAILAl'\lD, OFFERING 
CIRCULAR (Oct. 1 3 , 1 998) (on file with authors) . The most recent move towards attempting CACs 
began with the filing of a shelf offering by Mexico (presumably under United States pressure) 
where the stated intent was to use 75 percent majority action provisions for payment terms. See 
John Authers, Mexico Pioneers Plan to Ease Debt,  FIN. TIMES, Feb . 25 ,  2003, at 25 ,  2002 WL 
14178460. 
207. The analysis of good faith in the sovereign context in this Article ,  builds on a 
preliminary treatment in Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 104,  at 1339-42. 
208. There are a number of articles tackling the bondholder-stockholder conflict. See 
Caroline M. Gentile ,  Allocating Risk and Control: The Role of Bond Covenants in Corporate 
Governance, U.C.  DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (reviewing the literature) . In 2003, we have 
seen Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, South Mrica, Turkey, and Korea, among others, move to 
experimenting with CACs in their New York law bonds. Even prior to this ,  isolated issuances to 
countries like Lebanon and Qatar were not enough to garner attention, let alone produce any 
momentum for a market shift to CACs. On the prior issues, see MARK GUGIATTI & ANTHONY 
RICHARDS, Do COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES INFLUENCE BOND YIELDS? NEW EVIDENCE FROM 
EMERGING MARKETS 5-8 (Reserve Bank of Austl. ,  Research Discussion Paper No . RPD 2003-02, 
2003), http://www.rba.gov. au/rdp/RDP2003-02.pdf. 
209. See Sharon Steel Corp . v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. ,  691  F.2d 1039, 1049 (2d Cil'. 
1982) ; see also Katz v. Oak Indus . ,  Inc . ,  508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) . 
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Accordingly, interpretation proceeds within the four corners of 
the contract, even when a good faith breach is alleged.2 10 The rule is 
that no fiduciary or good faith duties run from the debtor to the 
bondholders unless the opportunistic conduct violates an explicit 
clause of the contract . This rule has been articulated despite black 
letter law that all contracts are subject to an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. As articulated in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, good faith is a backstop duty intended to protect parties 
who do not have specific contract provisions to protect them.2 1 1  In the 
majority of cases, to require a contract term first, as the rule for bonds 
does, is to say "no good faith duty ."2 12 
To make out a claim for a breach of the narrow good faith duty 
that applies to bond contracts ,  the bondholder plaintiff must 
demonstrate that it is clear from the "express terms" of the contract 
that a particular implied contract term would have been included in 
the contract if the parties had negotiated over it . 21 3  The result is that, 
to the extent a debtor takes an action pursuant to an express clause of 
the contract, the good faith argument is cut off.2 14 The court will not 
step in when the debtor (or creditor) takes an action pursuant to the 
express terms of the agreement, even if it happens to substantially 
impair the realization of another party's contractual expectations . 
2 .  Narrow Good Faith and Intercreditor Relationships 
The leading intercreditor case is Aladdin Hotel Co. v .  Bloom,2
15 
decided by the Eighth Circuit in 1953 .  It concerned an issue of real 
2 1 0. See William W. Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of 
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92 ,  120 n . 1 2 3  (citing Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. 
Empire , Inc. ,  589 F. Supp. 669, 673 ( 1994) (holding that an implied covenant of good faith derives 
substance directly from Indenture's language and cannot give debenture holders any rights 
inconsistent with those set out in the Indentures) and Katz, - 508 A.2d at 879 n .7 (holding that a 
corporation's duty of good faith to bondholders differs from its duty to stockholders» . 
2 1 1 .  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 204 cmt.d, 205 cmt.a (1981) .  
2 12 .  See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stoch and 
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 89 1 ,  933-34 (2002) . 
2 1 3 .  Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co. ,  708 A.2d 989, 992 
(Del. 1998) ;  Katz, 508 A.2d at 880; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc . ,  7 1 6  F. Supp.  
1504 ,  1 5 1 7  (S .D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied only 
where the implied term is consistent with other mutually agreed upon terms in the contract) . 
2 1 4. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 716  F. Supp. at 1 5 1 7  ("In contracts like bond indentures, 'an 
implied covenant . . .  derives its substance directly fro m  the language of the Indenture and 
cannot give the holders of Debentures any rights inconsistent with those set out in the 
Indenture.'" (quoting Gardner & Florence, 589 F.  Supp. at 673 (internal quotation marks 
omitted» ) .  
21 5. 200 F .2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953) .  
2004] SOVEREIGN DEBT REFORM 67 
estate bonds left over from a depression era composition. Interest was 
payable at 5 percent out of income only until maturity, which was 
after ten years.216 Thereafter, if the bonds were not paid down, 
interest was an absolute 8 percent, a high coupon in those days .2 1 7 
Before the tenth anniversary, a group holding a majority of the stock 
of the issuer purchased a majority of the bonds .2ls Unfortunately for 
the bondholder minority, the bonds contained a CAC. The CAC gave 
the dual majority a simple expedient on the tenth anniversary: Amend 
the bonds to extend the maturity date another ten years .219 The 5 
percent out of income interest provision was thereby also extended. 220 
This, as a practical matter, assured that no proceeds of the enterprise 
ever entered the pockets of the minority bondholders-insiders easily 
can manipulate things so that no "income" ever will exist . Had the 
securities been common stock, majority to minority fiduciary duties 
would have been available to protect the minority on this "freeze out" 
fact pattern. But the Eighth Circuit slammed the door in the minority 
bondholders' faces . 22 1  
Aladdin Hotel was decided before the articulation of the 
contemporary contract law good faith duty. But the case's spirit 
activates the later intercreditor cases. Most have arisen in the 
syndicated loan context. The courts proceed from the premise that the 
parties are sophisticated commercial actors who have entered into an 
arm's-length contract. Given this premise, the courts will not imply 
good faith duties unless the parties expressly contract for them. 222 
Hence, in First National Bank Ass 'n v. Canadian Imperial Bank of 
2 16 .  Id. at 628. 
2 17 . Id. 
2 18 . Id. 
2 19. Id. 
220. Id. 
2 2 1 .  Id . at 633. 
222. E.g., First Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. , 919 F.2d 5 10, 
5 1 4  (9th Cir. 1990) ; Aaron Ferer & Sons Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 1 F.2d 1 1 2,  122 (2d 
Cir. 1984) ;  Banco Urquijo,  S .A. v .  Signet Bank, 861 F. Supp. 1220, 1 249 (M.D .  Pa. 1994) ;  Banque 
Arabe Et Internationale D'Investissement v.  Md. Nat'l Bank, 8 1 9  F.  Supp. 1282,  1 296 (S .D .N.Y. 
1993); Banco Espanol de Credito v .  Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 45  (S .D .N.Y.  1991) .  
There is one New York case that suggests that creditors in syndicated loan agreements have 
meaningful obligations in the context of pursuing legal action against the debt. Credit Francais 
Int'l, S .A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, C A ,  490 N.y' S.2d 670, 684 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) . 
As the bulk of the case law cited demonstrates, however, this case has had little impact. For 
criticisms of the case, see Lee C. Buchheit, Is Syndicated Lending a Joint Venture ?, INT'L FIN. L .  
REV . ,  Aug . 1 985, at  12;  Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reiser, The Effect o f  the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Process on Inter-creditor Relationships, 1988 U. ILL. L .  REV. 493 , 502-04. See also 
Jeffery N. Brooks, Participation and Syndicated Loans: Intercreditor Fiduciary Duties for Lead 
and Agent Banhs Under U. S. Law, BUTTERWORTH J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L . ,  June 1995, at 275.  
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Commerce, when a group of banks in a syndicate entered into a 
standstill agreement with the borrower following a missed interest 
payment, the court rejected a minority member's argument that the 
majority was obliged to declare a default .223 Similarly, in New Bank of 
New England v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, when a majority of the 
lenders did not vote to accelerate the debt ,  despite the occurrence of an 
event of default, the court refused a minority lender's complaint that 
the majority was obliged to vote to accelerate.224 
The syndicated bank loan cases, although rej ecting a 
mainstream good faith inquiry, can be read narrowly on their facts. 
Thus read, they stand for the proposition that when a maj oritarian 
modification occurs in a distress situation, includes an equal payout to 
all the creditors,  and involves no side deal between the majority and 
the debtor, no violation of duties to the minority occurs .225 Aladdin 
Hotel presents more of a problem .  It specifically involves bonds and 
sustains a majoritarian amendment of the bond contract that effects a 
manifestly unfair transfer of wealth from the minority to the majority. 
One recent case, however, that does protect a bondholder 
minority is Federated Strategic Income Fund v. Mechala Group 
Jamaica, Ltd.226 There, a federal district court in New York barred an 
Exit Amendment offer that looked unfair to minority holders . 227 The 
amendments in question, effected under a CAC, would have 
essentially stripped the debtor corporation of all of its assets and left 
the dissenting creditors with only a shell against which to pursue 
their claims. A strict reading of the precedent on coercive exchange 
offers suggested that the debtor owed no significant good faith duty. 
The court, however, faced with the unfairness of the offer, had little 
trouble in deciding to block the transaction. 228 
223.  No. 3-93-366, 1995 U.S .  Dist LEXIS 12 105,  at * 1 4  (D . Minn. June 9, 1 995) .  
224. 768 F.  Supp. 1 0 1 7 , 102 1 -22  (S .D .N.Y. 1991);  see also Yucyco, Ltd. v .  Republic of  Slovn. ,  
984 F. Supp .  209, 221  (S .D .N.Y. 1 997) (rejecting minority creditor's claim that agent was obliged 
to declare an event of default and accelerate the debt-where the indenture required permission 
from the majority creditors to accelerate-even though the particular minority holder had been 
excluded from participating in the offer) . 
225.  In any event, syndicated loan disputes do not translate easily to the context of a large 
sovereign bond issue because the relationships among creditors in a syndicated loan tend to be 
tighter and the creditors are likely to be more sophisticated (generally banks and other financial 
institutions) than in the bond context. 
226.  No. 99 CIV 105 1 7  HB, 1999 WL 993648 (S .D .N.Y. Nov. 2, 1999). For a discussion of the 
case, see Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 74,  at 73. 
227. Federated Strategic, 1999 WL 993648, at *7,  10 .  
228 .  Id. at * 10 .  Similarly, in  a later Yucyco case incarnation from the one discussed above, 
Judge Chin was faced with a somewhat harsh action by the majority creditors. Yucyco, Ltd . v. 
Republic of Slovn. ,  1999 WL 169530 (S . D .N.Y. Mar. 25 ,  1999). What the majority creditors did 
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The bottom line still is that the case law gives a majority of 
cr�ditors wide rein in amending the terms of a bond contract pursuant 
to an express term. But Mechala at least suggests that the door could 
open for claims of bondholder majority to minority oppression. The 
case becomes stronger when reference is made to cases antedating 
Aladdin Hotel. 
3. The Special Case of Sovereign Debt 
Assume that the courts are not about to reconsider their 
rejection of good faith duties in the corporate bondholder context. 
There is nevertheless a case for an exception for sovereign bonds. 
The contemporary rejection of intercreditor duties occurred in 
the shadow of Chapter 1 1  and its predecessors. Inside Chapter 1 1 , a 
fiduciary regime including intercreditor duties comes to bear.229 This 
protective regime takes tentative steps in pre-bankruptcy distress 
situations,23o but self-protection by contract otherwise prevails outside 
of bankruptcy. The implicit judgment is that when they really need 
was to  consent to  release the obligor banks fro m  any and all claims under the prior debt 
agreement. Id. at *2. Yucyco had not been permitted to participate in the exchange agreement 
and yet had also lost its claims against the obligor banks. Id. As a formal matter, the court ruled 
that the action of the majority creditors violated a "no amendment" clause. Id. But a plausible 
argument was made by the defendants that this clause only applied to those items that had been 
carved out as exceptions to the majority Modification clause. [d. at *3. The court, however, went 
to something like a good faith rationale in saying: "A creditor would not have been likely to loan 
substantial sums under an agreement that would permit important rights-such as the ability to 
seek payment from certain obligors-to be extinguished by a simple vote of the majority of 
creditors ." Id.; see also Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad 
Times and Good, 105 HA.RV. L. REV. 1 82 1 ,  1833 (1 992) ("Even if the terms of the bond contract 
did not contain a term that expressly prohibited the debtor or its controlling stockholders from 
voting on amendments, it is hard to imagine any court today that would interpret a 'majority 
consent' provision to validate such a stripping of bondholders' entitlements." (footnote omitted)) .  
229.  Under Bankruptcy Code section 1 1 29(b) ,  a reorganization plan may not "discriminate 
unfairly." This is not a strict rule of pro rata treatment. Since the Code literally prohibits only 
"unfair" discrimination, by implication it allows for discriminatory departures from pro rata 
treatment so long as they are not "unfair." The justification is that the plan allocates a "surplus" 
over liquidation value to which all creditors have not made a proportionate contribution. 7 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY � 1 129.04 [3] [b] (Resnick et al. eds . ,  15th ed.  rev. 1996) .  
The leading case, In re Aztec Co . ,  107 B.R. 585, 590 (Bankr. M.D.  Tenn. 1989), offers a four­
part test to determine whether discrimination is unfair: (1 )  whether the discrimination has a 
reasonable basis, (2) whether the debtor can confirm a plan that does not discriminate, (3) 
whether the discrimination is in good faith; and (4) how the plan treats the classes discriminated 
against. For a critical discussion, see Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair 
Discriminatl:on in Chapter 1 1 , 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 (19 98) . 
230. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 275-90 (5th ed. 
2002) (describing application of fraudulent conveyance law and fiduciary duty to protect creditors 
in financial distress situations). 
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it-in severe distress situations-bondholders get protection. But, so 
long as the bond is paying, no solicitude need be extended. 231 
Sovereign debt is different because no bankruptcy regime 
protects sovereign creditors. It follows that bond contract law that 
assumes bankruptcy's availability does not translate well to the 
context of a distressed sovereign.232 The doctrine,  in effect, has a gap . 
We would fill it by having a judge interpolate good faith intercreditor 
duties in distress situations ,  especially in cases of opportunistic 
behavior on the part of a bondholder group .  
There is  precedent with which to fill this gap . To find this case 
law we have to look to the period prior to the creation of the federal 
bankruptcy reorganization regime.233 During that era, distressed 
corporate bond issuers and bondholders struggled in an environment 
not dissimilar from that facing sovereign issuers and bondholders .  
Unsurprisingly, the case law on bonds and bond contracts was 
different. 234 
The early twentieth century commentary suggests that a 
majority of creditors seeking to impose a restructuring plan on a 
dissenting minority owed the minority fiduciary duties . 2:35 The 
description of the duties as "fiduciary" may sound extreme today, but 
in those days the term also covered territory covered by today's good 
faith duty . Both commentators and judges from the period 
contemplated that a majority- driven debt restructuring, in which 
dissenting minorities were taking a haircut , would be subject to 
scrutiny. 236 Leading cases such as the Second Circuit's decision in 
231 .  See Metro Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc . ,  7 1 6  F .  Supp . 1504 (S . D . N.Y . 1989) . 
232. Cf. Tarullo, SlLpra note 9, at 633-40 (explaining how the differences between sovereigns 
and companies make it difficult to translate laws that govern companies to the sovereign 
context) . 
233.  On the federalization of bankruptcy, see David A. Skeel, Jr. , Rethinhing the Line 
Between Corporate Law and Corporate Banl�ruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 4 7 1 , 490-512  ( 1994) . 
234. Bratton, supra note 2 1 0, at 1 1 8 n. 1 14 (citing Francis Lynde Stetson, Preparation of 
Corporate Bonds, Mortgages, Collateral Trusts and Debenture Indentures, in STETSON ET AL. ,  
SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 25-27 ( 1 9 1 7) 
(justifying complexity of trust indentures, not on ground that no legal protection exists, but on 
ground that implied-in-law protection is too uncertain» . 
235.  See, e.g. , Charles H .  Haines, Jr. , Corporations-Modification Provis ions of Corporate 
Mortgages and Trust Indentures, 38 MICH. L. REV. 63, 67 ( 1939) . 
236. See Billyou, supra note 1 77, at 596-97 (describing the applicable law in England and 
Canada and noting that modifications in the United States were subj ect to similar restrictions in 
terms of court scrutiny); cf. Note, The Rights and Remedies of the Bondholder Under Corporate 
Bonds and Indentures, 27 COLUM. L. REV . 679,  584-86 (1927) (stating that the majority 
bondholders were assumed to be acting in the best interests of the bond class, but suggesting 
that the courts were especially concerned with collusive arrangement between the debtor and the 
majority creditors). 
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Hackettstown National Bank v .  D. G. Yuengling Brewing CO. 237 have 
never been explicitly overruled. 238 
The high water mark for discussions of majority-minority 
intercreditor duties was the period between 1 890 and 1 930 .  The cases 
and articles discussing them tended to involve the equity receivership . 
This was a judicial device used in the pre-bankruptcy reorganization 
era to assist firms, particularly railroads, whose distress implied 
economic j eopardy for the community as a whole . In those days,  
federal bankruptcy meant liquidation, which made no sense because 
the railroads were worth more as going concerns than as liquidated 
entities, and the economy depended on them in any event. The 
distressed railroads were interstate entities,  so state insolvency 
receivership laws were inadequate to tackle their problems, and there 
was no federal corporate reorganization mechanism. Hence, with the 
urging and assistance of Wall Street lawyers, most prominently Paul 
Cravath, the federal courts stepped in to supervise restructurings. 239 
A creditor would go to a judge and ask for the appointment of a 
receiver to take control of the debtor's assets . Eventually a creditor 
majority would present a plan to the j udge (a plan engineered by 
insider shareholders, and their lawyers and investment bankers) . The 
judge would issue a decree that would enjoin creditors from enforcing 
their claims against the reorganized corporation by using means other 
than those provided for in the decree.  Majority bondholders owed 
relatively strong obligations to behave fairly towards minorities .  
The precise contours of  the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century theory of intercreditor rights are difficult to discern, given 
that the j udicial opinions are context specific . Yet, we think it is clear 
237. 74 F. 1 10 (2d Cir.  1 89 6) . 
238. Hackettstown has language suggesting that creditors owe each other fiduciary duties. 
ld. at 1 1 2 - 1 4 . For the most part, however, the modern day bond cases do not mention it (perhaps 
because the lawyers are not aware of it and do not raise it before the court). One recent case that 
did tackle Had:ettstown was CIBC Banh & Trust Co. (Cayman) u. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 
F. Supp. 1 1 05 ,  1 1 1 5 n.8  (S .D .N .Y. 1995) .  In ClBC, the plaintiffs were asking that the court rule 
in their favor against what looked to be a collusive arrangement between the debtor and a large 
debt holder (one of the debtor's instrumentalities) on the basis of the implied duties of good faith 
among creditors. ld. at 1 1 14 .  The CIBC court ignored the broad language in Haclwttstown that 
suggested fiduciary type duties existing among creditors and instead distinguished Hachettstown 
by p ointing to the different factually situation there . leZ. at 1 1 1 5 n.8.  
239.  For a description of these equity receiverships that sets them in the context of a history 
of the developments in United States bankruptcy law, see DAVID SKEEL, JR . ,  DEBT'S DOMINION: A 
HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ArvlERICA (2001) .  
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that the level of concern for creditor rights during this period was 
higher than it has been since World War II . 240 
4 .  English Intercreditor Duties 
The commentators tell us that meaningful intercreditor duties 
also obtained in English law during the early portion of the last 
century.24 1  That voice of English authority faded during the course of 
the twentieth century, however. But, unlike United States contract 
law, today's English law does not interpolate a line of cases that 
rejects the proposition of good faith scrutiny of bond contracts . Until 
recently, there simply were no cases . Meanwhile, British bond issues,  
domestic and sovereign, have employed CACs, while British bank loan 
contracts have tracked United States practice and combined UACs 
and CACs . 242 
The period of silence ended recently with the decision of 
Redwood Master Fund Ltd. u .  TD Bank Europe Ltd. by the High Court 
in London.243 This intercreditor case suggests the possibility of goo d  
faith scrutiny. The case involved a syndicated loan arrangement under 
which the payment terms were covered by a UAC and the secondary 
terms by a CAC. The debtor was in distress .  A default on one of its 
borrowings had triggered a cross default prOVISIOn in the 
instruments-"tranche A"-upon which the plaintiffs had purchased 
exposure. The debtor had not yet drawn down the tranche A funds . 
Given the default, it had no right to do so, which was fine with the 
plaintiffs . The plaintiffs' problem was that other tranches had been 
drawn down and the majority of the lenders held interests in both the 
undrawn tranche A and the already-drawn tranches .  A conflict of 
interest resulted: Those who had already loaned money (and had not 
been repaid) wanted to keep lending from tranche A because the loan 
proceeds would flow through to repay the obligations from the other 
240. Indeed, in the Depression era, bondholder interests appear to have been the primary 
concern of the courts, legislatures, and policy makers . See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means 
Reconsidered at the Century 's Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 748 (2001) ;  David A. Skeel, Jr. , An 
Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND . L. REV. 1325,  1374-
75 (1998) . 
2 4 1 .  See Billyou, supra note 177,  at 596-97 (citing materials) . 
242. See ARMOUR & DEAKIN, supra note 184 .  
2 4 3 .  2002 WL 3 1 676297 (Ch. Dec. 1 1 , 2002) .  Given the rarity of  such cases, the case received 
considerable attention in the press (leading to articles with provocative titles such as "Bankers 
win court battle over the future of lending") and that brought it to our attention. E.g., Rob 
Mannix, Banlwrs Win Court Battle over the Future of Lending, INT'L FIN. L .  REV . ,  Jan. ,  2003, at 
4, 4 -5 ;  Best Interests of Lenders Paramount, TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 2003, 2003 WL 3 1 00029; 
Majority BanI,s: Authority, PLC MAG . ,  Jan. 1 , 2003, 2003 WL 12877470. 
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tranches . Those who had not loaned, however, had no  desire to see 
their money be put to use for that purpose by a distressed company. 
The clause governing a waiver of the default was a CAC.  An 80 
percent creditor majority used the CAC to waive the default .244 
Plaintiffs challenged, arguing that the maj ority's action violated the 
maj ority's implied obligation to exercise its CAC power "in the best 
interests of the class as a whole ."245 
The court recognized that the maj ority had an obligation to 
exercise its amendment power in good faith, but it found the plaintiffs' 
reading of the good faith duty too expansive . The implied duty of good 
faith, said the court, protected against actions that were "dishonest 
abuses" of majority power and amounted to "fraud."246 Alternatively, 
plaintiffs could win if they were to demonstrate that the exercise of 
majority power had been "motivated by a malicious wish to damage or 
oppress the interests of the minority ."247 The duty did not extend so 
far as to require that the majority make no changes that hurt one 
subgroup more than another. It was in order to enable effective 
decision making in such situations, the court explained, that the 
decision-making power had been delegated to the majority.248 The 
minority's good faith reading, in contrast, amounted to a minority veto 
right .249 
The court stated that these cases have to be decided on their 
individual facts and scrutinized for bad faith or fraud.250 On the facts 
of the case, it found that the waiver was beneficial for the holders of 
tranche A as a whole and that there was no bad faith or manifest 
unfairness .25 1 Taken together, this suggests that, despite the outcome, 
English courts will scrutinize the merits of cases where minorities 
challenge the majority's action on a CAC. It is less clear whether the 
case implies that good faith scrutiny was an active possibility in 
244. [d. Subsequently, the consent of over 95 percent of the creditors in value was obtained .  
[d. 
245. [d. In making their argument, plaintiffs pointed to the judgment in a 1 927 dispute 
between majority and minority shareholders, British America Nickel Corp.,  Ltd. u. M. J. O 'Brien, 
Ltd. , [1 927] A.C. 369, 371 (P. C .  1 927) ,  where Viscount Haldane said: " [T] he Power given [under 
majority voting provisions] must be exercised for the purpose of benefiting the class as a whole, 
and not merely individual members only. " Redwood Master Fund, 2002 WL 3 1 676297.  
246. [d. 
247. [d. 
248. [d. Plus, the parties in a syndicated loan arrangement were sophisticated p arties who 
knew what kind of arrangement they were getting into at the outset. [d. 
249. [d. 
250. [d. 
2 5 1 .  [d. 
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England throughout the twentieth century, thereby helping to explain 
the persistence of CACs in London issue bonds . But some inferences 
can be drawn. The parties in Redwood Fund vigorously contested 
what the common law precedents dictated, suggesting that the 
historical practice did not predict a clear result. At the same time, the 
absence of recent case law, taken together with the serious reception 
accorded the plaintiffs argument, suggests a standing expectation of 
judicial scrutiny.252 
5 .  The Contrary View 
We fight a rear guard action in arguing for good faith. At first 
cut, the sovereign context looks much the same as the traditional 
corporate one. Sophisticated parties enter into detailed contracts. The 
sovereign debt cases from recent years suggest that courts view things 
this way. 
252 .  A hint as to the historical understandings of intercreditor obligations is also contained 
in a recent review of a private bankruptcy settlement by the Supreme Court of Judicature. In 
reaching its decision that the private settlement was void, the court found that there was an 
implicit good faith duty among creditors. Somji v. Cadbury Schweppes, PLC, 2000 WL 1881249 
(Ch.  Dec. 20, 2000) .The court, although explicit that it was not relying on cases prior to 1996,  
stated that 
Id. 
the deputy judge's impressive survey of old law [predating the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1996] shows that in relation to compositions and arrangement with 
creditors the court did impose a strict requirement of good faith as between 
competing unsecured creditors . . .  [and although] there is no strong 
presumption that a similar presumption must be found in the new regime 
[created in 1996] . . .  (to put it at its lowest) it would be no great surprise to 
find it in there in one form or another. 
Although we articulated intercreditor duties as good faith obligations, an English court 
might also characterize them as either fiduciary or implied duties. English law appears to 
contemplate both possibilities. On fiduciary duties,  English law appears to keeps a fairly open 
definition of such duties and often adds fiduciary relationships as it sees fit. See J.  Beatson, 
ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 267·68 (28th ed. 2002) . The three broad categories of fiduciary duties 
that already exist are as follows : relationships of trust and confidence; relationships of 
powerlinfluence/discretion; and relationships of confidentiality. See P.J.  Millett, Equity 's Place in 
the Law of Commerce, 1 14 LAW Q. REV. 2 14 ,  21 9 ·21  ( 1 998) ;  see also Alexander F.R. Lokem, 
Fiduciary Duties and Implied Duties of Good Faith in Contractual Joint Ventures, J.B.L. at 550-
56  (Nov. 1 999) .  One could argue that intercreditor duties fit either of the first two categories .  
Moving to implied duties (and it is  worth noting that the judge in Redwood Masters used the 
concepts of "good faith" and "implied duties" interchangeably at times), there appear to be three 
types of implied terms: (1) terms that the parties probably had in mind but did not bother to add 
in the contract, (2) terms that the parties, regardless if they had them in mind, would have 
agreed to if the issue was raised, and (3) terms that, regardless of whether they had them in 
mind, would have added to the contract if they had foreseen the difficulty. Glanville Williams, 
Language and the Law, 61  LAW Q. REV. 7 1 ,  401 (1945) . Depending on context, interCl'editor 
duties could fit into any one of the three ca tegories. 
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In Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru ,  
the borrower's lawyers argued that the court should use principles of 
comity to thwart an enforcement action by a holdout creditor .253 The 
Second Circuit said no . Writing for the panel, Judge Calabresi 
explained that the United States interest in allowing contract 
enforcement actions trumped the need for a smooth debt resolution 
process:  
First, the United States encourages participation in, and advocates the success of, IMF 
foreign debt resolution procedures under the Brady Plan, Second, the United States has 
a strong interest in ensuring the enforceability of valid debts under the principles of 
contract law, and in particular, the continuing enforceability of foreign debts owed to 
United States lenders, The second interest limits the first so that, although the United 
States advocates negotiations to effect debt reduction and continued lending to 
defaulting foreign sovereigns, it maintains that creditor participation in such 
negotiations should be on a strictly voluntary basis, It also requires that debts remain 
enforceable throughout the negotiations,254 
Similarly, in Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion,255 
the same court rejected another sovereign plea. This time the request 
was that the court use principles of champerty to block the holdout 
creditor's actions.256 The court quoted Judge Calabresi's language from 
Pravin Bankers and explained that it  was not going to  take an action 
against the holdout creditor that in effect produced an involuntary 
"cram down."257 We point these cases out to flag two things. First, 
their tone is hostile to the notion of intercreditor obligations. Second, 
that hostility appears to follow from the courts' perception of United 
States interests. We discuss the importance of the second point later . 
Finally, CIBC Banh & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Central do 
Brasil258 involved a sovereign debtor, an intercreditor dispute , and a 
discussion of intercreditor law from the turn of the twentieth century. 
CIBC Bank bears a factual resemblance to Aladdin Hotel.  The 
plaintiffs were minority holders of Brazilian debt under a syndicated 
loan agreement.259 One of the other lenders in the syndicate was 
Banco do Brasil ("BdB") , an instrumentality of the state .260 Brazil had 
defaulted on its obligations and CIBC wished to accelerate the debt.261 
253 ,  109 F , 3d 850, 853·54 (2d Cir. 1 997).  
254. Id. at 855 (citations omitted) . 
255. 194 F. 3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999) . 
256. Id. at 369. 
257.  Id. at 380. 
258. 886 F. Supp . 1 1 05 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  
259. Id. at 1 107 .  
260. Id. 
2 6 1 .  Id . 
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Through the debt holdings of BdB, however, Brazil was able  to block 
CIBC's attempt to accelerate because the contract required a vote of 
more than 50 percent of the creditors and BdB owned 51 percent.262 
Citing old intercreditor duty cases such as Hackettstown, the plaintiff 
argued that the collusive arrangement between Brazil and BdB 
violated the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing.263 The court, 
however, stated that the old case law was inapplicable because it 
involved "compositions,"  that is, restructuring agreements that the 
parties make when the debtor is insolvent. 264 This case, it explained, 
was about a contract dispute, and the plaintiff knew fully well at the 
time of contracting with Brazil that BdB was a lender.265 Hence, had 
the lenders wanted a clause that restricted BdB from having its votes 
counted, they should have asked for it at the outset. 266 
The case repeats the hard line that no implied duties obtain in 
respect of action explicitly authorized by the contract. 267 That said, 
the court failed to confront the old cases and commentaries. First, it is 
not clear that intercreditor duties existed only in the context of a 
composItIOn or insolvency. As discussed, the language about 
intercreditor duties from that period appears stronger.268 Second, 
Brazil was indeed going through a composition; Brazil had defaulted 
on its debt and had to renegotiate . The plaintiff was a minority 
creditor suing under the old debt instruments because it did not want 
to go along with the new plan Brazil had proposed. 
C. Summary 
The CIBC court should have scrutinized the deal. Whether it 
would have found anything is another question. Similarly, a bond 
market shift from UACs to CACs should be viewed as a material 
262.  Id. 
263.  The Hachettstown decision was pointed out to the court by the p laintiffs in a 
supplemental letter to the briefs. See id. at 1 1 1 5 n.8 ; see also Letter from Martin London, 
Attorney, Paul Weiss Rifkind & Wharton, to Judge Loretta A Preska, U.S .  District Judge (May 
1, 1 995) (on file with authors) . 
264. CIBC Banh & Trust Co. ,  886 F. Supp. at 1 1 1 5. 
265. Id. at 1 1 16 ·17 .  
266. Id. at  1 1 17 .  
267 .  Judge Preska quotes the following language from Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v .  
RJR Nabisco, 716  F.  Supp. 1 504, 1 5 1 7  (S .D .N.Y. 1989), one of  the standard cases in modern 
debtor-creditor law: "In contracts like bond indentures, an implied covenant derives its 
substance directly from the language of the Indenture, and cannot give the holders of D ebentures 
any rights inconsistent with those set out in the Indenture ." CBIC BanI< & Trust Co. ,  886 F .  
Supp. at  1 1 16 .  
268 .  See supra notes 234-240. 
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change in circumstances j ustifying a shift to good faith scrutiny. For 
endorselnent of this assertion, we look to no less an authority than the 
United States Treasury. 
We think the Treasury, having promoted CACs, has a 
responsibility to intervene in subsequent litigation to explain the new 
regime and its implications for the judicial role . There is precedent for 
such intervention. In Allied Bank International v . Banco Credito 
Agricola de Cartago, Costa Rican banks had defaulted on their 
obligations as the result of their government's decision to restrict 
outflows of foreign exchange .269 1 70 out of 1 7 1  creditors agreed to a 
composition.270 The one holdout accelerated its debt .271 The Second 
Circuit, in its first hearing of the case, and consistent with what it 
perceived to be the creditors' interest in an orderly restructuring of the 
debt, blocked the acceleration.272 On rehearing en banc, however,  the 
Justice Department informed the court that the government's policy, 
while favorably disposed to orderly restructurings, primarily favored 
allowing the creditors to enforce their contracts .273 In other words , 
private ordering (and holdouts) were to trump the policy rationale that 
had guided the court's first decision. The resulting en banc decision of 
the Second Circuit reversed the court's earlier position.274 This policy 
position was later echoed in Judge Calabresi's opinion in Pravin 
Banker275 and then again in Banco de la Nacion.276 
If the government were to make a similar appearance today, it 
presumably would state the opposite position.277 From the public's 
269. 757 F.2d 5 16 ,  5 1 9  (2d Cir. 1985) . The Allied Ban!? decision and creditors' coordination 
problem in the absence of sovereign bankruptcy were much discussed issues in the mid· 1 980s.  
See, e.g. , Stephen Bainbridge, Comity and Sovereign Debt  Litigation: A Banhruptcy Analogy, 1 0  
MD. J .  INT'L L .  & TRADE 1 ,  2 9  ( 1 986); Andrew C .  Quale, Jr. ,  Allied Banhs ' Effect o n  International 
Lending, INT'L FIN. L. REV . ,  Aug. 1985, at 26; Ruben Sklar, Renegotiation of External Deb t: The 
Allied Banh Cases Clnd the Chap ter 1 1  Analogy, 17 U. MIAMI INTER·AM. L. REV. 59 (1984);  Roger 
M. Zaitzeff & C. Thomas Kunz, The Act of State Doctrine and the Allied Ban!? Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 
449 ( 1 985). 
270. Bainbridge, supra note 269, at 29 .  
2 7 1 .  Id. 
272.  Allied BanI?, 7 5 7  F.2d at 5 1 9·20.  
273.  Id. 
274. Id. at 523 .  On Allied Banh, see Tarullo, supra note 9, at 676 and more generally, 
Bainbridge, supra note 269.  
275.  1 09 F.3d 850 (2d Cir .  1 997).  
276. 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1 999). 
277. See Tarullo, supra note 9, at 676 (pointing out that the Justice Department can inform a 
court that the government's policy had changed (while also suggesting that it is not clear a court 
would depart from the pattern of literal enforcement of debt contracts)) .  While the government 
policy in Allied Ban!? was to urge the court to allow the non cooperating creditors to sue, that 
position had softened by the time of the CIBC case, where the United States government amicus 
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perspective-one where the rich countries want to avoid bailouts and 
the poor countries want to avoid the pain presently suffered by 
Argentina-the goal should be to help CACs survive.  If the courts fail 
to police opportunistic behavior, the markets likely will move b ack to 
UACs,  as opposed to undertaking the daunting task of contracting for 
more explicit good faith duties .  The government accordingly could tell 
the courts that public policy considerations point towards a default 
rule of meaningful good faith intercreditor duties .  
In sum, w e  proj ect that the courts could b e  persuaded to turn to 
the old equity receivership cases (especially if supported by an amicus 
brief from the United States government) . Such scrutiny would not 
prevent a majority of creditors from taking actions to enable a 
restructuring of a distressed sovereign's debt . It would simply enable a 
displeased ' minority creditor to ask for review of the maj ority's 
modification plan. That heightened judicial scrutiny would bring with 
it heightened uncertainty and the possibility that the modification 
plan will be set aside. But that is not a bad thing if creditors are 
concerned about coercive modifications and the scrutiny lends comfort . 
In the long run, creditors who feel safer will be more willing to lend. 
We are left with two sets of solutions at different ends of the 
spectrum. Under the prevailing weak good faith doctrine, the maj ority 
of creditors under a CAC can use modification terms to solve the 
holdout problem.  The problem is the risk of oppressive maj ority action. 
The result is the bondholders' preference for UACs ,  which in turn 
creates the holdout problem. To persuade creditors to move to, and 
stay with, the use of CACs,  they need a substitute for the protections 
that UACs otherwise provide them.  Key among these protections are 
good faith duties .  
One solution would be to include these gap-filling duties within 
a new statutory bankruptcy scheme for sovereigns. There are reasons 
for preferring a statutory scheme over contractual modification.278 
But the only plausible statutory scheme on the table today is that of 
the IMF and neither the creditors , the debtors , nor the United States 
Treasury want anything to do with it . 279 That means that the most 
brief expressed concern about the actions of vulture creditors. See Charles D.  Schmerler, 
Lit igating Defau lts on Souereign Debt Law, Policy Struggle to Defer to Foreign States While 
Honoring Lenders ' Rights, N .Y. L.J. ,  Apr. 15 , 2002, at S l .  
278. See, e.g. , David A. Skeel, Jr . , Can Majority Vot ing Pro uisions Do It All, 52 EMORY L.J. 
4 1 7  (2003) . 
279.  See, e.g. , Miller, supra note 1 ,  at 1 84, 196-97 (describing the United States Treasury's 
views on CACs, where although the United States prefers CACs to the SDRM, it serves its 
purposes to keep the threat of the SDRM open so as to induce the markets to try CACs) ; A Better 
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likely solution will be a move to CACs under New York contract 
law.280 For that solution to remain stable, the courts interpreting 
these contracts need to read implied duties into the contracts . 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When a policymaker from Washington asks a bondholder to 
exchange her UAC bond for a new bond with a CAC,  the bondholder 
will be suspicious.  "Policy," after all, often means a loss of value 
inflicted  to advance someone else's agenda. Recent debates in 
Washington do not allay such suspicions . The talk centers on ways to 
make sure that, when help is extended,  none of it comes the 
bondholders' way. At a time when the value of the bondholders' 
investments has plummeted, institutions not known to make sacrifices 
themselves sternly lecture the bondholders on the need to take less.  In 
such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that the bondholders resist 
reform. 
If the policymakers expect the bondholders to exchange UACs 
for CACs ,  they will have to allay their fears . This accommodation 
could come in the form of money, but there is no money. We offer 
several second best solutions. First, the policy makers need to 
emphasize that sovereign bondholders reasonably can be asked to 
make give ups only as a means to the end of creating surpluses.  Then 
the policymakers need to state that the fair division of those surpluses 
is their top policy priority. To make that statement credible, they need 
to confront the deficit in legal protection. When compared to their 
corporate counterparts , sovereign creditors already have fewer 
protections . 281 To delimit these p rotections without providing a 
credible substitute creates the risk that the creditors will take their 
money and play elsewhere . 282 
Way to Go Bust, supra note 1 3 , at 64 (reporting that "most financiers, whether bankers or 
bondholders, loathe the SDRM") , available at 2003 WL 6244817 .  
280. See Miller, supra note 1 ,  at  1 84, 196·97. 
281 .  See SHLEIFER, supra note 2, at 5· 10 .  
282.  See id.  at 4·5 (reviewing evidence showing that where creditor and shareholder rights 
receive more protection, investment levels are higher and markets are thicker) . 
